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ABSTRACT
 Since May 23rd, 1942 when Mao Zedong outlined his directives regarding arts 
policy in his closing remarks as the “Talks at the Yan’an Conference on Literature and 
Art,” there has existed a singular interconnection between Chinese art and politics. 
Throughout various political and ideological campaigns, artists and writers were 
treated as a “cultural army” to mobilize the people and to engineer the soul.  To this 
end, artists and writers were often constrained to specific topics and styles and subject 
to both censorship  and self-censorship.  An examination of the results of these 
constraints and the reaction on the part of artists as well as viewers of this work 
provides a window into an important aspect of socialist life: the often tense 
relationship  between the ideological demands of the Party and the private desires of 
the Chinese people.  
The intent of this thesis is to describe both the nature of propaganda work and 
the system of controls under which it  was created.  Specifically  I will describe the 
constantly shifting political winds, the tightening and relaxation of content and 
stylistic limitations, and the variegated, often ambiguous, sometimes violent 
ideological movements, all of which had a profound effect on artistic and literary 
production.  This description includes all major political movements starting with the 
“Yan’an Talks” in 1942, the ways in which control systems continued to affect  art  and 
literary  production after Mao’s death in 1976, and how this system continues to  have 
influence today.  This thesis also attempts to make preliminary conclusions about the 
effectiveness of propaganda materials and their potential unintended effects.  The 
purpose of these observations are to highlight the areas in which the study of Chinese 
propaganda materials is deficient and thus create a space for my future dissertation 
work.
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 In Heroes and Villains in Communist China, Joe C. Huang discusses the 
problem of distinguishing propaganda from fine art, “…art moves people while 
propaganda does not.  A Chinese novel moves the reader not because of its propaganda 
message but because of its artistic presentation of reality through the novelist’s private 
vision.  While he has to comply with political reality, he also wants to create.”1 The 
skillful artist, therefore, so carefully interweaves the propaganda message into his 
representation of social conditions and interpersonal relationships such that the 
natural, human response to his work is in agreement with its intrinsic political goals. 
It is such a delicate, improbable proposition: to harness all artistic creation and apply it 
toward attaining precise political and ideological goals.  Media have always been a 
viable tool for politicians and ideologues; but less attention has been paid to the fact 
that the arts are generally a blunt instrument.  Their creators are notoriously unreliable 
and prone to heterodoxy, and its audience is both fickle and unpredictable. In socialist 
China the historical, traditional Confucian role of the intellectual coupled with the 
profound penetration of politics into everyday life from 1949 and continuing to a 
lesser degree even today  created an atmosphere that Maoist theory  gambled was 
conducive to successful propagation.  Through the scope of history, one can see that 
the projects of Chinese communism were nothing less than a failure.  The major social 
movements that propaganda promoted-- the Great Leap  Forward, The Cultural 
Revolution, and intervening campaigns cracking down on "rightism"-- are phenomena 
inherently  associated with disaster.  At the time of propaganda's production, however, 
artists were for the most  part cooperative when it came producing works along party 
lines, and audiences were generally responsive when it came to their message, whether 
out of revolutionary faith and dedication or out of simple self-preservation.  
1
1 Huang, Joe C. Heroes and Villains in Communist China; the Contemporary Chinese 
Novel as a Reflection of Life (Pica Press, New York, 1973) pg. xi
           The relationship  between arts and politics is exemplified in the art  and literature 
of any  culture; however, the media of China's socialist past and even the Chinese 
media today  exhibit a singular interconnection with politics, despite the liberalizing 
influences of increasing global awareness and economic reforms.  Social trends, 
economic prosperity or destitution, and politics are just some of the factors that 
influence artists and writers to create.  The politicalization of media and the profound 
extent to which politics shaped social trends, affecting the daily lives of all Chinese 
people, ensured the relative uniformity  of these factors in China and their effect on 
writers and artists.  In his 1942 Talks at the Conference on Literature and Art, Mao 
Zedong established that political considerations must take precedence over artistic 
when it came to the production of media, and the Party had total control over the 
production and distribution of media, including art, songs, literature, poems, and films. 
This thesis concentrates on the role of two major forms of propaganda: art  (largely 
poster art) and literature.  
            Art and literature were the two most prevalent arms of media controlled by 
Party bureaucracy and co-opted in the service of the state.  They categorically-- but 
not always uniformly-- reflected the policies and trends of the party  during the 
socialist period.  Artists needed to be reminded of their role in the socialist literary 
system, and these reminders came in the forms of crackdowns and criticisms that  left 
many artists to wear the dreaded "rightist" hats.  This is not to say that propaganda art 
and literature were devoid of diversity, innovation, or even contradiction.  However, 
the changing images of propaganda art and the modulating scope of socialist  literature 
closely reflect the changing focus in party ideology and occasionally, while the 
political weather was warm, reflect reactions to this change in focus.  If the intent, and 
more importantly, the effects of these materials were limited to methodic manipulation 
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of public opinion, their role would not be as worthy of academic exploration.  Art  and 
literature can be records of history, transmissions of hopes and idealism, and 
reminders of past folly.  When viewed today, Chinese propaganda media have the 
singular quality  of conveying all of these functions at once.  Furthermore, the 
functions of art and literature continue to evolve, even long after their forms are 
rendered immutable.  This quality  is precisely what makes these materials fascinating 
to study.
This paper is primarily a survey describing the roles and functions of 
propaganda art during the major social movements in China from 1949-present, the 
nature of its often parallel relationship to the literature of these periods, the 
homogenization of artists by political controls, the ways in which artists broke from 
the trend, and the ways in which control was reinforced.  I concentrate more on the 
propaganda poster than on literature.  Though both are very  important, the propaganda 
posters were cheaply  and easily produced and did not require their audience to be 
literate to convey their message.  As a result, the propaganda poster was far more 
ubiquitous, and therefore more influential and possibly more effective.  The possibility 
that literature, with its potential to convey deeper messages, and its primarily urban, 
intellectual audience might have more potential to be effective because its target 
audience was more of a threat to Party orthodoxy is a worthy consideration; however, 
it is not  necessarily  a sound conclusion.  It is possible, for example, that  the targets of 
literature as an educated group were more likely to be the targets of anti-intellectual 
campaigns as well.  As a result, they would be more cynical and less receptive to 
propaganda messages.  More research into the effects of propaganda images and 
literature needs to be done in order to properly explore this question. 
3
Figure 8: Zhao Zongzao, Go to Vote, 1953
In examining the relationship between the art and literature in each social 
movement, I will show that their similarities underscore the depth of control Chinese 
politics exerted on all forms of media; the points at which they diverge are an 
indication of their differing target audiences and breadth of scope.  By examining 
propaganda produced during this period, I do not seek to give a complete picture of 
Chinese society itself; it is far too complex to be expressed in any single medium. 
Rather, one can gain a better understanding of the Chinese socialist art and literary 
systems; and since this system was undeniably and deeply  influential, by studying it 
we can gain a more multi-dimensional understanding of Chinese society than through 
the study of history, or literature, or art alone.
4
Propagandizing in China
“So why, I thought, did China have to be so unified, so straight—so boring?  The Chinese 
Communists had done even better than Stalin at homogenizing everyone’s views.  Why, I 
wondered, was this?  How could it come about?  […]  I’m afraid it has something to do with 
the nature of the Chinese people.  They generally submit to authority, seek an appearance of 
public unity, and are embarrassed by breaks in decorum.”2
                                -Liu Binyan
Though the focus of this paper is the propaganda media of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP), this form of media did not suddenly spring forth in 1949 at the founding 
of the People's Republic.  Art  in service of politics was codified as a policy at the 
Yan'an Conference on Literature and Art in 1942, but the concept that a social 
consciousness could be engineered through control of arts and literature is deeply 
rooted in China's Confucian tradition.  The charge of historical Confucian ideology is 
the maintenance of harmony through moral instruction and correct policies.3  The 
Confucian ideal of a benevolent  scholar-ruler’s importance lies beyond his dominant 
position in social hierarchy; he is a protector of social harmony.  And to that end, he is 
a moral model for others to emulate.  One of the central moral virtues in Confucianism 
is the observance of the five cardinal relationships: father and son, ruler and subject, 
husband and wife, elder and younger brother, and between friends.  The relationship 
most relevant to this discussion, ruler and subject  (ruler and minister) is based on 
another important Confucian concept: loyalty (zhong).  The Confucian ruler could 
expect his subjects to obey without question because he had the Mandate of Heaven, 
which conferred upon him the power to rule until Heaven judged him based on his 
morality  to be unfit.  The fact that a ruler ruled was proof of his moral rectitude.  The 
5
2 Liu, Binyan.  Interview.  “An Interview with Liu Binyan” by Perry Link, September 
2004
3  Lieberthal, Kenneth Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform (W.W. 
Norton & Company, New York, 2004) p. 16
imperial civil service examinations that determined appointment to Chinese 
officialdom since the Tang dynasty was one method by which models of Confucian 
ideals were transmitted to each generation of scholars.  The examinations tested 
scholars’ ability to understand and reproduce classical Confucian texts with the 
assumption that mastery of the texts would cause the student to emulate the morality 
and proper behavior that the texts described.4  Another main method by which 
governors propagated Confucian ideals was through representations of model moral 
characters for emulation.  As a result, politics, morality, and artistic expression are all 
deeply tied to Chinese intellectual consciousness.  Chinese political culture has used 
the arts to propagate ideals of correct behavior and thought throughout Chinese 
history.  By  the time the CCP began using media for their own ideological uses, 
fourteen centuries of Confucian propaganda appealing to social harmony and public 
morality  had already proven that social engineering was in theory an achievable reality 
in Chinese political life. 
 The role of Communist propaganda media was in large part derived from, or a 
re-conception of, the well-established Confucian artistic tradition of creating models 
for emulation.  The post-1942 conception of the tradition constitutes social 
engineering beyond propagating vague values such as “proper moral 
behavior” (though some propaganda did have this goal).  The objective was to achieve 
specific social goals by shaping every person’s innermost character according to 
deliberate CCP plans. Given the anti-Confucian impulse of Chinese radicalism of this 
period, the fact that social engineering has a deep  connection to Confucian tradition 
represents an interesting historical paradox. 
 
6
4  Link, Perry Evening Chats in Beijing (W.W. Norton & Company, New York and 
London, 1992) p. 11
Propaganda has served a variety of functions.  Early  on, the emphasis of 
propaganda was sometimes on reeducation of the masses, such as in the case of 
posters proclaiming the legitimacy of the Communist government, or as in literature 
describing the valiant and heroic deeds on the part of Communist resistance soldiers in 
the “Chinese People's War of Resistance to Japan,” which served the same 
legitimizing function.  Propaganda was also used to promote economic reform. 
Ideological campaigns in support of economic reforms were a symptom of and remedy 
for the problem of achieving economic development despite an agriculture-based 
economy, scarce capital, and a lack of heavy industry.  The Marxist theory of change-- 
materialism-- holds that the underlying development of the economic structure of 
society determines the boundaries of human activity.  Lenin later modified this theory 
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Figure 1: Shao Wenjin, Beat 
the Drum of the Great Leap 
Forward Ever Harder, Date 
Unknown
to place more emphasis on the potential effectiveness of revolution to accelerate 
history.  Mao took this idea further, arguing that Chinese people could, with the proper 
revolutionary  outlook, overcome any  material odds to accomplish his goals.5  The 
existence of movements like the Great Leap Forward are proof of this conviction; and 
propaganda campaigns in support of these movements were among Mao's primary 
weapons in making his conviction reality.  It is not hard to imagine that  these political 
needs have profoundly affected the development of Chinese artistic and literary 
creation during the socialist period, begging the question that introduced this paper: 
should propaganda media be considered art?  More to the point, can one consider it  to 
be “good art?”
 The question of whether or not art  and literature had an audience that 
appreciated propaganda materials for aesthetic reasons is beyond question.6   Many 
people enjoyed unambiguously propagandistic art and literature, perhaps despite their 
ideological functions, perhaps not.  Rather, I regard a more utilitarian interpretation of 
the term “good” as more pertinent: did propaganda media serve its purpose.  This 
seemingly simple question is fraught with problems about whose purpose, at what 
time, and from whose perspective.  One person did have a well-defined opinion of 
what constitutes good in socialist art; and his opinion was paramount among all others. 
Mao Zedong said in his momentous closing speech at the Yan’an Conference on 
8
5 Lieberthal Governing China p. 63
6 I will explore this issue later in the paper where subjectivity and the effectiveness of 
propaganda media will be presented. 
Literature and Art in 1942, “Nothing can be considered good unless a large number of 
people benefit greatly from it.”7
This strictly utilitarian view of “goodness” and the unity of politics and art did, 
for better or for worse, effectively erase everything but the homogenized, official 
view, in that media played a major role in disseminating major social movements like 
the Great Leap Forward, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and the Four 
Modernizations.  To that extent, propaganda media were effective.  But to what degree 
did propagandizing (read: politicizing) interfere with the creative, “pure” artistic 
elements of media creation?  One could argue that all art and literature is created in 
some social and political context, and that this context affected artistic output. 
Perhaps “pure” art cannot exist unless its creator could exist outside his own social 
and cultural consciousness, which would appear to be impossible.  However, Chinese 
socialist art was not  just subject to the nebulous effects of society, culture, and politics 
via their influence on artist’s subjective interiority.  They  most often painted or wrote 
with the purpose of fulfilling a leader’s expressed command.  Perry Link writes in The 
Uses of Literature, “We can rightly say that a political leader’s command is extraneous 
to literature, but  it does not follow that  the writer’s response is also extraneous. 
Writers comply, resist or, more often, do a mixture of the two, and such responses 
might be carefully thought out, unconsciously  reflexive, or somewhere in between.”8 
Despite the heavy-handed influence of political leaders, an artists’ work still reflects 
his or her desire to create, and in the Chinese case more often than not a genuine 
9
7 McDougall, Bonnie S. Mao Zedong's "Talks at the Yan'an Conference on Literature 
and Art": A Translation of the 1943 Text with Commentary (University of Michigan, 
Ann Arbor, 1980) p.74
8 Link, Perry The Uses of Literature (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2000) p.4
desire to contribute to society  out of deference to traditional notions of scholarly 
responsibility.  
One example of an artist who willingly contributed to the communists’ efforts 
was Gu Yuan, whose woodcut Restoration of the Anshan Steel Mill appears in Figure 2 
above, was a well-known and accomplished woodcut artist and nianhua painter who 
joined the communists in 1938 at Shaanxi.  He became one of the founders of the 
Yan’an style, and a professor in the Central Academy of Fine Arts as well as standing 
director of the Chinese Artists’ Association.9 Another example of an artist who joined 
the communist movement early  is Yan Han, who produced artwork alongside the Eight 
10
9 “Gu Yuan” Sweet Briar College Art Gallery Website, http://www.artgallery.sbc.edu/
exhibits/00_01/chinesewoodblock/guyuan.html 
Figure 2: Gu Yuan, Restoration of 
the Anshan Steel Mill, 1948
Route Army fighting the Japanese in the War of Resistance.  In order to propagandize 
effectively, he was able to adapt folk images to Communist doctrines (Figure 3).10
Many writers had out of genuine concern for the welfare of China also 
embraced the idea that there was a correct “path” that China should follow to progress 
and that writers should sacrifice their personal visions to help China down this path.11 
Readers of this period were generally  supportive of the new government, as indicated 
by their genuine enjoyment of early revolutionary works.  Readers enjoyed  socialist 
narratives of revolutionary struggle like Yang Mo's The Song of Youth and Zhou Erfu's 
Morning in Shanghai because the memory of the problems of 1930s and 1940s China 
were still on readers’ minds, and the idealism portrayed in these works was a welcome 
11
10  Andrews, Julia F. Painters and Politics in the People's Republic of China, 
1949-1979 (University of California Press, Berkley and Los Angles, 1994)  p. 97
11 Link, Perry ed. Stubborn Weeds (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1983) p. 
2-6
Figure 3: Yan Han, New Year 
Door Guardian: A People's 
Fighter, 1939-1940
change. These works would by the later years of socialist media come to reflect an age 
of nostalgia and optimism. 12   Throughout the age of continuing revolution, the CCP 
gradually exerted stricter controls over the scope of permissible topics and techniques, 
and so artists who lived through this period later regarded early socialism as a “golden 
age.”
 It is hard not to believe in light of the long tradition of artists influencing 
morality  in China that the government went to such lengths to create a system in 
which artistic expression was so closely regulated.  The cycle of repression and abuse 
that writers and artists endured is a testament to the fear that sanctioned ideologues 
had of the potential influence of these intellectuals.  Their power was in large part due 
to the Confucian tradition described above, but tradition was often also a great 
weakness.  Even after the Communist Party repressed them repeatedly, intellectuals 
continued to try to express themselves out of habit  and duty.13 Writers and artists could 
be motivated by self-interest and career calculations.  But it would be a mistake to 
automatically assume that works created outside socialist literary  and art controls 
automatically equal dissent. It is important to note, as I have shown above, that one 
major concern for writers and artists was the traditional concept of intellectual 
responsibility, a tradition that Mao Zedong invoked and exploited since May 1942, 
when he made his speeches at the Yan’an Conference on Literature and Art.
12
12 Link, Perry Uses of Literature p. 67
13 Link, Perry Evening Chats in Beijing p. 141
Control and the Monopoly on Information
“Ideological warfare and literary and artistic warfare, especially if these wars are 
revolutionary, are necessarily subservient to political warfare, because class and mass 
needs can only be expressed in a concentrated form through politics.”14
                                     -Mao Zedong, Yan’an Talks, 1942
Communist control of art  and literature was first articulated at the three week long 
“Yan’an Conference on Literature and Art” that was held May 2 – May  23, 1942.  Mao 
Zedong’s opening and closing speeches had lasting influence in shaping the attitude 
writers and artists had toward their role in the communist system.  They  also 
exemplified the depth of control Mao had over the media even before the Chinese 
Communist Party was the official government regime.  The purpose of the speeches, 
from the point of view of a government aspiring to unify  China under one rule was to 
ensure shared values and morals following the perceived breakdown during the 
Nationalist Period (1912-1949).  In general, the speeches were an elaboration on 
Stalin’s concept of art and literature as a political weapon in class struggle and 
revolution.15  Soviet theory and practice were the inspiration for much of Mao’s 
cultural policy.  
13
14 McDougall Talks at the Yan’an Conference p. 75
15 For details about early socialist realism in the Soviet context, see Struve, Gleb 
Soviet Russian Literature, (George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., London, 1935) 
particularly pages 238-251
Up until the breakdown of relations with the Soviet Union in 1959-1960, Chinese 
artists would go to the Soviet Union to study the techniques used there.  Mao’s 
approach to using the experience of foreign countries as a guide to formulating 
cultural policies is a typically pragmatic one: “In the international sphere, the 
experience of foreign countries, especially  the Soviet Union, can be used to guide our 
work in reaching a wider audience and raising standards, provided that their 
experience is good.”16  Mao advocated the use of socialist realism (in the speeches, 
proletarian realism), which was a Soviet creation.  Socialist  realism was an “inspired 
mirror” that reflected the ideals of Socialism as well as a vision of its utopian future. 
In reality, it was a mirror that reflected a struggle on the part of sanctioned ideologues 
to inculcate correct attitudes.  This introduces a considerable challenge when one 
14
16 Ibid.,  p. 72
Figure 4: Artist Unknown, The 
central people's government 
constitutes the only legitimate 
government of all the people of 
the People's Republic of China, 
1949
analyzes these works.  How does one account for the distortions this type of art 
creates?  What aspects of real socialist  life can one glean from these materials? 
Maybe one can not hope to see the reality of socialist life in socialist realist art and 
literature, but  the vision of idealized life is important in understanding what hopes and 
ideals drove the Chinese people forward through some of the greatest human tragedies 
in history.
 Mao’s strategy for reaching the masses with art and literature was to emphasize 
the importance of the proletariat to the mostly intellectual, bourgeois writers and 
artists.17  He called for the artists to form a “cultural army” to go among the people 
and gain an understanding of their values.  Mao, using a common strategy  that he will 
repeat throughout history, cites “mass needs” to rationalize his policies regardless of 
whether or not his prescriptive policies actually coincide with actual popular needs. 
However, bending Chinese intellectuals to the will of the state was not  an 
unprecedented proposition, as indicated in the above discussion of Confucianism. 
What is especially  significant about the 1942 Yan’an Talks is the rejection of art for 
art’s sake and belles lettres as self-indulgent and bourgeois.  He said, "In the world 
today, all culture of literature and art  belongs to a definite class and party, and has a 
definite political line.  Art for art's sake, art that stands above class and party, and 
fellow-traveling or politically independent art do not exist in reality.”18  Beyond the 
effect of severely  limiting the scope of permissible literary and artistic topics, the 
statement had the effect  of legitimizing or rejecting certain styles based on their 
“proletarian” or “bourgeois” backgrounds, respectively.  For example, the traditional 
Chinese end of year painting style, nianhua, was deemed appropriate for adaptation to 
15
17 Ibid., p. 61  Here Mao is certainly implying that the present writers and artists are 
bourgeois. 
18 Ibid.,  p. 75
socialist needs since it decorated even the poorest peasant homes, while the traditional 
landscape style, guohua, was judged to be the art of the bourgeois class because this 
style often appeared on the walls of the wealthy.  
 Yan’an policy, while remaining official policy, was still contested in literary 
scene during the 1950s.  In fact, in the late 1950s and early  1960s, there was 
movement toward the liberalization of literature, even toward depoliticization of 
literature, as well as the reform of guohua.  Unfortunately, this trend was cited as 
“betrayal of principles” and was one of the impetuses for the Cultural Revolution.19 
This pattern of liberalization followed by crackdown repeats itself relentlessly 
throughout the campaigns and history of socialist Chinese art and literature.
 Mao was correct to cite the disunity of artists in China.  Many artists were still 
in Nationalist-controlled areas (particularly in large cities) while the Communists were 
engaged in the Long March, and therefore they were not necessarily familiar with 
Communist policies.  One of the problems that Mao wanted to pre-empt was 
sectarianism.  He said, "…the only way to get rid of sectarianism is by raising the 
slogan, 'Serve the workers and peasants, serve the Eighth Route and New Fourth 
Armies, and go among the masses,' and actually  carry  it out in practice; otherwise, the 
problem of sectarianism will never be solved.  Lu Xun has said that disunity  on the 
front of revolutionary literature and art is caused by lack of a common purpose, and 
that this common purpose is to serve the workers and peasants."20  Vice Premier Zhou 
Enlai reiterated the need for unity, among other concerns, in his opening speech at the 
All-China Congress of Literary and Arts Workers in 1949.  He made five points: 
unification of all artists is necessary, artists were to serve the people, popularization is 
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more important  than raising standards, old literature and art were to be remolded, and 
art leaders must avoid factionalism and serve the entire country.21
 The effect of the Yan’an Talks was that literature and art from the very 
beginning of Socialism had no course but to be shaped by political controls.  Media 
were subject to censorship-- both the censorship  of a substantive system of literary and 
artistic control, the purpose of which was unequivocally for social engineering and 
self-censorship.  Artists would never consider producing explicit dissent because the 
state (via the Department of Propaganda) controlled the modes of literary production. 
There was no private publication.  The state would never publish it, and dissent could 
only lead to punishment.22  Apolitical, non-utilitarian art became akin to dissent as 
well.  One artist describes his art education as a small boy: "Only once did I just 
happen to paint a garden with artificial mountains, pavilions, and winter flowers.  I 
was immediately told off by my brother.  'That is a garden of the land-owning class!' 
he said.  Then I was only painting what I had done on holiday (watch goldfish).  The 
teacher's comment: 'Of absolutely no educational value.'"23 The Yan’an Talks became a 
battle cry for leftist conservatives throughout socialist history when ideologues 
perceived that the literary/artistic atmosphere was growing too liberal; it often 
heralded another turn in the cycle of reform and relaxation followed by  crackdown and 
rapid return to conservatism.  
 When one looks at the cliché and generally  mediocre works of art and 
literature under Chinese Communism, one may  be surprised to find how influential 
they  really  were.  It is interesting to see how successfully these images and stories 
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penetrated people’s consciousness.  Poet and fiction writer Duo Duo writes in Chinese 
Propaganda Posters, “Suddenly I discover myself among them; I see my family, my 
neighbors, millions of people.  A whole era comes flooding back.  I keep  looking at the 
posters.  The person I am today observes the first half of my life.  What emotions am I 
feeling?  Apathy?  Shame?  Disgust?  Abhorrence?  Or nostalgia?  None of the above? 
Or maybe a mixture of all of them?"24  The images in posters were relevant, even 
essential for creating models for moral, social, and political life.  Author Anchee Min 
writes in Chinese Propaganda Posters about her desire to emulate the ideal image of a 
revolutionary youth, even going so far as to dress like her idol in the poster.25 
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Figure 5: Posters in a farmhouse in 
Anhui Province.  Opera posters, a 
Cantonese pop artist portrait, and 
The People's Heroes, a 1984 
propaganda poster, 2000
This is not difficult to believe given the depth of penetration that socialist  media, 
particularly propaganda posters had in everyday Chinese life.  They owed their 
ubiquity not only to the supporting role they played in political campaigns, but also 
because politically  themed posters found their way onto the walls in kitchens, 
bedrooms, and dormitories-- penetrating the lowest levels of social organization.  It is 
apparent that deliberate and strategic implementation of artistic talent coupled with 
strict party control over distribution and access to media could lead to new social 
consciousness at least to this degree.
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The Ways in Which Control was Enforced
“By now the strongest censorship, by far, is our own self-censorship.  Every time I write, I 
seem to feel a shadow peering over my shoulder—‘shouldn’t say this’…’musn’t phrase that 
point quite that way.’ But even when I force myself to be conscious of these insidious 
pressures, I go along with them anyway, because I want to be published.  It would be worse if 
I couldn’t be published at all.”26
                                                -Anonymous Chinese Historian
 The Party controlled (and to a lesser extent continues to control) art and 
literature on many levels and through many different mechanisms, including an 
extensive bureaucracy that ensured uniformity of directives and propaganda goals; 
work units and publishing houses that ensured compliance with directives by  issuing 
materials, determining what gets published, and regulating access to educational 
materials and other media; fine arts institutions to homogenize artistic styles and 
methods and ensure that artists only employed Party-approved styles; and State-owned 
distribution to minimize the availability of materials that the Party did not sanction.  
The Communist Party bureaucracy was massive.  Its endless hierarchy of 
departments and sub-departments played an important role in the development and 
implementation (or non-development and non-implementation in many cases) of the 
arts. Julia Andrews produced a diagram listing the most important parts of the 
bureaucracy  during the period 1949-1979 in her book Painters and Politics in the 
People’s Republic of China, which I have adapted for reference below:27
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Party directives regarding propaganda goals were conveyed to artists, fine arts 
institutions, and presses via this bureaucracy.  In order to ensure continuity between 
the civil administration and the party  administration, key administrators help 
appointments in both the civil and party branches of government.28 The bureaucracy 
was not nimble.  Administrators on the lowest level would hold meetings to explain 
assignments.  Problems or questions with directives would require deliberation on the 
part of administrators, who were always reluctant to give a concrete decision.  Often, 
issues would have to move up  the ladder of the bureaucracy  until a sufficiently 
powerful and influential administrator could give a final decision.  The problems 
inherent in this bureaucratic system were a popular subject for art and literature after 
the Cultural Revolution, when such criticisms became permissible.29 
 The most important organization in a Chinese worker’s life was the work unit 
(danwei).  Fine arts institutions and publishers directly  employed professional artists 
and writers who were particularly  proficient and cooperative.  The Chinese Artists 
Association or the Chinese Writers Association employed the most accomplished of 
21
28 Ibid., p. 5
29 Numerous examples of these kinds of works can be found in Stubborn Weeds (see 
above, note 11)
these artists and writers.  These prestigious positions allowed for a number of rare 
privileges, such as access to restricted materials (foreign or political literature, for 
example) and opportunities to travel to other cities or even in rare cases to other 
countries.30  However, many artists and writers could not support themselves on the 
income from their writings or artwork alone, and were employed by  different work 
units (factories, for example), submitting their artistic contributions through that unit’s 
propaganda department, or submitting stories for a pay rate per thousand characters.31 
The work unit had considerable power over the lives of all Chinese workers, and art 
workers were no exception.  Julia Andrews writes: “The power of the work unit to 
affect both the daily private life and the creative life of the individual artist effectively 
prevented extreme forms of professional or social behavior, including open political 
dissent.  In essence, the work unit  policed the attitudes and daily behavior of its 
employees and punished those who committed infractions.”32 In addition to providing 
housing, food rations, and authorization to marry and reproduce, work units were the 
mechanism by which party directives reached art workers.  Work units would provide 
assignments and materials, and a studio to carry them out.33  In addition, affiliation 
with a work unit is often what gave workers in the literary field access to library 
materials, which unlike the Western library system, was not  a universal right.  Work 
units and powerful individuals had priority over library materials and a ration of 
journals, and work units concerned with education or propaganda had the best access 
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to these resources, even access to some restricted materials.34 If one of the principle 
goals of Socialism was to prevent  workers from being alienated from the means of 
production, alienating intellectuals from the means of their production was certainly 
not a consideration.  The advantage of this system was that the administration’s 
control over the artist’s resources as well as the uniformity of artist’s daily lives 
ensured compliance with party directives.  If an art  worker did not produce a work that 
suited the needs of the party bureaucracy, or worse, produced a work that diverged 
from party ideology, not only would their unit not recommend the work for publishing, 
the artist also risked receiving punishment. 
 The motivation for many artists and writers, naturally, was to be published and 
recognized for their work.  The desire to publish their work accounts for a great deal 
of cooperation with Party policies on the part of writers.  One way the administration 
controlled what stories were published was by  allocating paper to publications’ 
editorial boards.  The State Publication Administration, which checked for materials 
that would be potentially unhealthy  for the masses to read, allocated the annual 
amount and quality  of paper that publishers could use.35   Naturally, publishers who 
were most cooperative would receive more paper at better rates.  Artists also desired 
recognition among their audience and peers.  In socialist  China, recognition of 
excellence in art was not under the purview of popular opinion, private organizations, 
or peer review.  Rather, prizes for particularly exemplary work were awarded through 
the Ministry  of Culture, which was a part of the government bureaucracy.36  In this 
way, policy makers ensured that artists received recognition based on art that  complied 
23
34 Link, Perry Uses of Literature p. 172-173, 190
35 Link, Perry Stubborn Weeds p. 17
36 Andrews, Julia F. Painters and Politics p. 66
with ideological and stylistic guidelines rather than artistic excellence or stylistic 
innovation.  
 The lack of stylistic innovation was not only the result of carefully and 
deliberately  meted-out recognition on the part of party bureaucracy.  The institutions 
where artists and writers received training and the styles they taught were also a 
homogenizing factor.  Early on, if an artist wanted his work published, only  three 
styles were acceptable to the regime: nianhua, woodcuts, and lianhuanhua.  Only  after 
1952 did the party begin to tacitly  accept the traditional landscape painting style, 
guohua, as well as oil painting.37  Nianhua, or “new year’s pictures,” is a term for 
pictures produced to celebrate good fortune and wealth at the end of the year.  They 
traditionally  feature themes like plump  babies, fat fish, gods of wealth, or any 
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 Figure 6: Example of New 
Nianhua, Through Cooperation, 
the Electric Light Was Fixed, 
Zhang Yuqing, 1957
combination of the three.  Because popularization was a key goal in early socialist art, 
artists adapted the technique into “new nianhua,” a simple, dark outlined, flat-colored 
technique that was favored in the CCP over more technically demanding techniques 
like oil painting.  However, because it is such a simple technique, artists tended to look 
down on it.38    
 Woodcut artistry is an ancient technique that socialist artists adapted for their 
purposes.  Artists had already adapted this technique to form the “agitational style” 
that characterized the wartime woodcut prints of 1930s and early 1940s (ex., Figure 
7).  Typically, these prints were dark and moody; in other words, totally unsuited to 
socialist realism as it was described at  the Yan’an Talks.  Iris Wachs writes in her paper 
“Themes, Style, and the Historical Background,” “…the use of chiaroscuro, large 
areas of black, and portrayal of the masses as debased and oppressed--characteristic of 
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 Figure 7: Example of 1930s 
Woodcuts, Call to Arms, Huang 
Xinbo, 1936
this art in the 1930s and 1940s; had been deemed in the Yan’an Talks to be unsuitable 
for art intended for the masses, and these characteristics had been removed from the 
category of acceptable styles.”39 No longer able to use the techniques they had used in 
the 1930s and 1940s, artists like Zhao Zongzao, who had committed themselves to the 
Communists’ cause, adapted woodcut techniques to be less dark and more cheerful—
more in the spirit of socialist realism (Figure 8). 
Similarly  in literature, writers who had produced work with darker themes 
during the 1940s changed styles in keeping with the spirit of socialist  realism.  For 
example, the writer Ding Ling grew famous after publishing her story "Miss Sophie's 
Diary" in 1927.  This somewhat sarcastic and ultimately fatalistic work is about a 
young woman who lives alone and suffers from tuberculosis.  Despite being very 
lonely and depressed, she deliberately  eschews her friends’ attempts to cheer her up. 
She remains prideful throughout the story even though this feeling ultimately fills her 
with a sense of self-loathing.  This work would definitely not have been appropriate 
for publication under the socialist system.  However, being an ardently faithful 
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Figure 8: Zhao Zongzao, Go to Vote, 1953
believer in the communist cause, Ding Ling varied her style to produce acceptable 
works.  Her efforts culminated in the novel The Sun Shines Over the Sanggan River, 
which won her the Stalin Prize for literature in 1951.40 Her 1940 story “When I Was In 
Xia Village”41 is about a woman from a small village who was taken by the Japanese 
and contracted a sexually transmitted disease when she was forced to serve as a 
“comfort woman.”  She becomes alienated from nearly all the other people from her 
village, as she has the stigmas of having been sexually enslaved and having learned to 
speak Japanese.  Though in the end she goes to Yan’an with the prospect of treatment 
and an education, the focus of the work is still the gloom and intolerance she faces. 
By contrast, Ding Ling’s 1954 work, “The Trial” is an account of a village undergoing 
land reform, and the “trial” of a deposed landlord, who is subjected to beating, 
humiliation, and the division of his property  among the villagers.  Despite a 
widespread desire to kill the landlord, the villagers show him mercy  and allow him to 
live with his son, who is a member of the Eight Route Army.  The stylistic differences 
between “When I Was in Xia Village” and “The Trial” are vast, and demonstrate how 
the imposition of the socialist  realist aesthetic can affect  the individual writer.  The 
earlier work, “When I Was in Xia Village” is considerably more sophisticated in its 
dialogue and descriptive techniques, reflecting the broader scope allowed for creativity 
in writing.  “The Trial” exhibits no qualities that indicate that it is the work of any 
particular writer.  This is to be expected given the demand for popularization over 
quality in socialist literature of the period.  
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Obviously, one main concern from the perspective of artists is the 
homogenizing effect these controls could exert on the development of styles and 
themes.  Does this level of control over artistic and literary production destroy 
creativity?  Mao Zedong addressed this question at the Yan’an Talks when he said:
It’s true that empty, dry, and dogmatic formulas will destroy creativity, 
but more than that, they will first destroy Marxism-Leninism. 
Dogmatic Marxism-Leninism is not Marxism-Leninism at all but anti-
Marxism-Leninism.  Then Marxism-Leninism won’t destroy creativity 
after all?  Yes, it will, it will definitely  destroy  feudal, bourgeois, petty 
bourgeois, liberalist, individualist, nihilist, art-for-art's sake, 
aristocratic, decadent, pessimistic, and other kinds of creativity that are 
alien to the popular masses and the proletariat.42
Mao did not entirely  dismiss the importance of aesthetics, however.  He acknowledged 
that art  that lacks artistry cannot be effective, despite being politically progressive.43 
Despite Mao’s willingness to acknowledge these concerns, in actual practice, party 
policies could be very  harmful to creativity.  In some cases, homogenization of styles 
and art creation in response to party  directives still led artists to produce very similar 
works. Figures 9 and 10 are just two examples of an extremely common phenomenon.  
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One of the factors dictating the party’s policies on art and literature, reflected in the 
various movements toward liberalization and crackdown, was a constant balance of 
artistic proficiency pitted against the danger of regarding aesthetics too highly, at the 
expense of the political message. 
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Figure 9: Artist Unknown, Joining 
the Young Pioneers, 1980
Figure 10: Artist Unknown, I 
Have Put on the Red Scarf, 1983
Secondary Uses of Socialist Propaganda 
"A struggle began to rage deep inside me: how could two diametrically opposed ‘truths’ 
coexist in the world?  The longing of the peasants were one truth, and the policies of the 
higher-ups and the propaganda in the newspapers were quite another."44
    -Liu Binyan, “Listen Carefully to the Voice of the People”
One possible way of studying socialist  art and literature is to regard them as 
social documents.  After all, these works reflect patterns of life that very few outsiders 
could experience before China “opened up” during the late 1970s.  Unfortunately, 
given the nature of socialist realism, the assumption that art  and literature reflected 
actual daily life is simply  false.  Instead of regarding this non-representational 
character as a disadvantage, however, scholars can instead use it as a tool for gauging 
actual conditions.  For example, if one examines the reactions that people who lived 
through the Cultural Revolution have to Cultural Revolution-era propaganda, and 
finds that the reactions are generally cynical or derisive, one can conclude that the 
“representations” are particularly non-representative.  I have also found that discussing 
reactions to revolutionary propaganda is a generally innocuous method of broaching 
the subject  of a person’s personal history, which is useful for gaining an understanding 
of an era from the “unofficial” perspective.45  
From the perspective of art and literary  workers, propaganda had the important 
effect of serving as a barometer that measured changing “weather.”  In Evening Chats 
in Beijing, Perry Link describes the process intellectuals used to read the People’s 
Daily (official newspaper) “upside down” in order to get its real meaning, as well as a 
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sense from the ubiquitous wall slogans of what party leadership wanted of 
intellectuals.46
 High-level political leaders had another use for propaganda as well: support in 
factional struggle.  One example is the struggle between Zhou Enlai (who represented 
a limited amount of liberalism when it  came to the arts) and Jiang Qing (Chairman 
Mao’s wife and sycophant, who was the ultimate conservative when it came to the 
arts).  Zhou Enlai supported producing apolitical, pleasant works of art to serve as a 
bridge from the CCP to the outside world, while Jiang Qing regarded this effort as an 
incursion into her territory, namely  the realm of the arts.  As a result Zhou was subject 
to attacks on his policies via black art  exhibitions, which were exhibitions of art of 
which the party  disapproved.  These exhibitions involved criticism, self-criticism, and 
confessions on the part of the offending artists.47  Propaganda and factionalism is 
discussed in more detail below, particularly in the section regarding Cultural 
Revolution-era propaganda.  
 Another use of propaganda, which is possibly the most obvious, is aesthetic 
pleasure.  Many people found propaganda posters in particular to be aesthetically 
pleasing, as indicated by  their ubiquity as home decorations.48   Often, propaganda 
posters were the only exposure that common people had to art. Xiaomei Chen 
describes her appreciation for the posters as art in China “Growing up  with Posters in 
the Maoist Era” despite having become disillusioned with their message: “…I did not 
find them offensive.  No longer crediting their spirit or content, I still, to some extent, 
appreciated posters as one of the few public artworks available in an era when there 
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were plenty  of sculptures of Mao but few art museums.”49  One could interpret the fact 
that she appreciated them on an aesthetic level and ignored their ideological content as 
an indication that posters did not successfully serve their ideological or political 
functions.  I regard it as more likely, however, that this testimony is an indication that 
there are other, more insidious forces at work.  If people appreciate the posters for 
their artistic content and do not pay too much attention to their ideological function, 
their political message may be absorbed in an unconscious manner.  This suspicion is 
at least partially confirmed, as both Xiaomei Chen and Anchee Min report having an 
overwhelming desire to “be just like” the shining, idealized image of a revolutionary 
female worker they encountered in posters.
 Other potential secondary uses of socialist propaganda were, to a limited 
extent, vicarious experiences on the part of the audience.  Stories that featured heroism 
were popular, perhaps owing to the reader’s ability to imagine himself defending the 
motherland against  Japanese invaders, or doing other heroic deeds in the name of 
Socialism.  Particularly  in the Modernization era, posters that featured modern 
machinery, big cities, and foreign cultures were a factor in helping Chinese people 
come to terms with modernization and western influences.  
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Propaganda from 1949- 1966
“It is a mass culture that emphasizes content over form, use value over exchange value, a 
participatory communal action over heterogeneous everyday life.  Hence, such a mass 
culture is profoundly romantic in its form and utopian in its vision; it is necessarily didactic 
rather than entertaining, production-oriented rather than consumption-oriented.”50
    -Xiaobing Tang in Chinese Modern
 Initially, propagandizing communist ideals and revolutionary theory was 
closely linked with education and efforts to combat illiteracy, an effort  that continued 
throughout the revolutionary  era.  From 1935 to 1945, the “Yan’an Era,” propaganda 
was systematized “…into a comprehensive framework that gave printed material more 
transformational, agitational and administrative dimensions.”51  Since the party 
consolidated artists and the means of artistic production and systematized propaganda, 
propaganda effectively  became a byproduct of the interplay between Mao’s 
revolutionary  ideals and the bureaucratic administrative structures that carried out his 
directives.  
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 The first notable propaganda campaign of following Liberation corresponded 
with the Korean War and the contemporaneous drive for economic reform.  The 
Korean War, or "War to Resist  America and Aid Korea,” was portrayed as a just, 
humanitarian cause.  Not surprisingly, Chinese propaganda stresses the Chinese role in 
the conflict, portraying the volunteer army as doing most of the fighting.  In this 
campaign, one can already see Chinese artists taking the Soviet idea of socialist 
realism and implementing it with specific goals; namely, drumming up domestic 
support for the war by portraying heroic military models for emulation.  It  is not 
difficult to discern the relationship between the campaign for increased industrial 
production and support for North Korea.  In some posters, increasing industrial 
production is associated with a patriotic duty to aid Korea against American 
imperialists. The effect of this campaign on artists was extensive because of the 
xenophobia that  the Party  promoted.  Artists were forced to substantially  reduce 
foreign (particularly Western) influences on art, leading to support of native styles like 
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 Figure 11: Yu Yunjie, Helping 
Mother Acquire Culture, Date 
Unknown
nianhua.  This campaign represents the early trend toward actively repressing artists’ 
expressive, creative tendencies.  In earlier instances of propaganda implementation, 
artists followed general guidelines set forth by  the party like, “art must serve the 
people,” and “learn from the proletariat.”  This relatively minor campaign begins the 
cycle of control and repression that characterizes the major social movements of 
socialist history.
 One such major social movement with wide-ranging consequences was the 
Hundred Flowers Campaign.  "Let a hundred flowers bloom: let a hundred schools of 
thought contend” was a policy that  encouraged intellectuals to criticize the party and 
progress toward Socialism.  It was also an opportunity  for artists to explore new 
modes of artistic expression.  The campaign lasted from 1956 roughly until the 
summer of 1957, after which the amount and scope of the criticisms exceeded 
Chairman Mao’s tolerance for them.  Iris Wachs’ paper Themes, Style, and the 
Historical Background compiles the main points of a leading Chinese Artists 
Association cadre Zhou Yang, describing the new liberal policies of the Hundred 
Flowers:
In the struggles of the past when the situation was tense, it was required 
that artistic and literary activity  be coordinated with urgent tasks at a 
definite time and place, so as to produce an immediate political 
agitational effect among the masses" (p. 181).  But "the broad masses 
of artists and writers have now become more closely united on the basis 
of a common idea of serving the people" (p.180). Unfortunately, 
however, "doctrinairism ... in literature and art ... [has] seriously 
restricted the creative freedom of artists and writers" (pp.180-181). 
"Doctrinairism ... manifests itself in vulgarizing and over-simplifying 
the Marxist view of aesthetics, and putting fetters and constraints on 
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artists" (p.181). "In the choice of subject-matter and form, [artists] 
should be given an ample measure of freedom (p. 182).52
The origin of the Hundred Flowers Campaign is an interesting topic that provides 
insight into the initially fruitful but ultimately tenuous relationship China had with the 
Soviet Union.  The inspiration for the policy that Mao expounded upon at the Yan’an 
Talks, socialist realism, was originally a Soviet creation.  The policy was originally 
outlined as early as 1917 during the Bolshevik October Revolution and was later 
altered after Stalin’s death at the Second All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers in 
1954.53  The policy, which originally read, “Socialist  realism, the basic method of 
Soviet belles-lettres and literary criticism, demands of the artist truthful, historically 
concrete representation of reality in its revolutionary development.  At the same time, 
truthfulness and historical concreteness of artistic representation of reality  must be 
combined with the task of ideologically remolding and training the laboring people in 
the spirit of Socialism,” was reiterated in 1954 with the second sentence omitted.54 
This reflected an increasingly tolerant atmosphere in the Soviet literary sphere 
following Stalin’s death.  What is surprising, however, is that despite the close 
relationship  between Soviet and Chinese art policy up to this point, the change was not 
mirrored in China, at least not immediately, even though Chinese artists and writers 
continued to study in the Soviet Union until 1957.  A brief examination of the timeline 
reveals a lag in the relaxation policy: Stalin’s death, March 6, 1953; about nine months 
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later, the Second All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers, December 15, 1954.  It  was 
not until 1956 that the CCP began actively relaxing controls over intellectuals. 
Perhaps one could understand the Hundred Flowers Campaign as an extension of the 
relaxation of controls over Soviet writers.  Another explanation is that Mao Zedong, 
planning for rapid economic development and requiring the cooperation and technical 
talent of non-party intellectuals, sought to gain it  by ordering bureaucrats to relax 
controls over the arts.55 Yet another explanation is that Mao used the Hundred Flowers 
Campaign as a deliberate trap  to flush out opposing elements among the intelligentsia. 
Most likely, as with many historical events, the campaign was a result of a confluence 
of these factors. 
 The results of this campaign were many.  Writers published stories that 
criticized the ineffectual bureaucracies and the extremes of party  control.   They 
produced some of the most liberal literary works in the entire period from 1949 to the 
appearance of scar literature in 1977.  Artists used the liberal period as an opportunity 
to break free of their stylistic limitations.  Guohua, the traditional form that artists 
originally  used mostly for painting landscapes underwent a revival.  Under the 
principle Mao Zedong expressed at Yan’an, “We do not  by any means refuse to use the 
old forms of the feudal class and the bourgeoisie, but in our hands these old forms are 
reconstructed and filled with new content, so that they also become revolutionary  and 
serve the people,”56  artists sought a compromise.  Artists used the guohua style to 
covey  socialist realist images, like in the 1958 ink on paper drawing On Furong Lake 
by Qian Songyan (Figure 12).  
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The image, though traditional in style and materials, shows an industrial and 
ostensibly  prosperous town.  Factional rivalries stemming from stylistic differences, 
which the homogenizing effect of party  restrictions on style had largely suppressed, 
reemerged.  By far the most important result of the Hundred Flowers Campaign was 
an opportunity  on the part of artists and writers to resume a more traditional role as 
guides on the forefront of morality and society, rather than mere bureaucratic tools 
with no autonomy.  The newfound liberalism and the resulting expressions of 
dissatisfaction with aspects of the communist regime coupled with growing 
factionalism among students and administrators who began to emphasize 
individualism, technique, and reputation57  were the impetuses for one of the most 
infamous and traumatizing campaigns targeting intellectuals: the Anti-Rightist 
Campaign in 1957.
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 Figure 12: Qian Songyan, On 
Furong Lake, 1958
 In June 1957, Chairman Mao began a movement to purge the perceived 
"rightists" that had polluted the quest for Socialism.  Was this movement Mao’s 
deliberate trap  for "anti-party" elements, or had the reaction to suddenly-loosened 
restrictions been more virulent that  Mao had anticipated?  In either case, hundreds of 
thousands of writers, professors, economists, and scientists suffered criticism, 
incarceration, forced labor in the countryside, or they committed suicide.  Even worse, 
many of those who received the "rightist" label were not necessarily guilty  of 
attacking the party or undermining the revolution: many  "rightists" were branded 
based on anonymous and possibly unfounded accusations.  Many work units punished 
“rightists” because the units were forced to uncover a certain quota of criminals to 
denounce, regardless of whether or not they had any criminals to denounce.58  The 
Anti-Rightist movement was a major blow to intellectuals’ status and any remaining 
shreds of their traditional role as moral guides at the pinnacle of society.  The Anti-
Rightist movement was also an early  lesson to all artists and writers: one cannot 
implicitly  trust that  policies allowing greater freedom of expression and trends toward 
liberalism will not suddenly reverse course, wreaking havoc on all those who 
participated and many  who did not.  Those who were lucky enough to escape the 
rightist label learned to take material, careerist, and personal safety considerations 
over artistic integrity.  
 After 1957, Maoist artistic and literary  policies are either actively anti-
intellectual or passively so.  These policies were a departure from the 
contemporaneous Soviet model of socialist development.  The Soviet model stressed 
full utilization of technical expertise while maintaining control over art and literature. 
But in the wake of the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the anti-intellectualism of 
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following campaigns, Mao persecuted all types of intellectuals, leaving him in tune 
with the party’s large peasant base but with a severe dearth of technicians and 
professionals to drive modernization.  Interestingly, throughout the Anti-Rightist 
movement, most writers and readers did not attribute the problem of “anti-party” 
elements to problems within the party itself; instead, they assumed that there 
genuinely was a problem with their own attitudes.59   This tendency is one of the 
factors that allowed the cycle of relaxation and repression to continue throughout the 
social movements since 1949, and it  is what ties the cycle to socialist artists and their 
traditional notions of the morality of the state and the ideal intellectual.  After the 
disastrous famine of the Great Leap Forward, however, intellectuals began to suspect 
that the problem might be from above and not from within. 
 One can best understand the Great Leap  Forward not as a single campaign, but 
as a “spirit” and set of priorities.  The goal of the GLF was to accelerate the normal 
stages of economic development by  forcing extraordinary effort on the part of the 
masses, communalize agrarian production, and surpass Great Britain in steel 
production within 15 years.  The basic belief was that the Chinese people could 
overcome technological limitations by virtue of sheer will power and revolutionary 
zeal.  Naturally, one of the main methods by which the party  intended to meet these 
goals was to depend on the supporting propaganda campaign.  Stories that glorified 
communal life dominated literature.  Socialist realist, larger-than-life peasants, steel 
workers, and soldiers in dynamic, idealized poses done in the nianhua style dominated 
the posters of the era.  Common themes are that of bountiful harvests (Figure 14), 
successful communal farm life, or quality steel production (Figure 13).  
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These images were thoroughly disconnected from reality.  The economic policies of 
the Great Leap Forward, initially problematic and disruptive to agrarian production, 
collapsed into large-scale disaster as a combination of man-made and natural factors 
led to famine.  Cadres, faced with extremely poor crop performance and low quality 
steel output, were not eager to admit having failed their objectives and therefore over-
reported their harvests.  Naturally, increasingly deluded members of the party 
leadership demanded even higher increases in crop yields and more steel production. 
These historical facts present  a case wherein propaganda did not succeed in its 
objective, but also its effect  (i.e. encouraging production at all cost) may  have been to 
worsen an already disastrous situation.  
 Party policies emphasized the role of workers, peasants, and soldiers (gong, 
nong, bing) in shaping Chinese social consciousness.  The effect of this policy  on 
primarily  urban writers and artists was forced development of a proletarian 
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 Figure 13: Song Enhou, Again Good 
Quality Steel, 1959
consciousness (or at least the appearance of it).  To facilitate this process, the party 
tried the two-pronged approach of forcing artists and writers to spend part of their time 
working alongside peasants as well as train worker and peasant-class students in the 
fine arts institutions.  During the Great Leap Forward, much of the artistic productivity 
of professional artists went to aiding workers and peasants in the creation their own 
works.  Amateur art produced by the masses was featured and praised in journals and 
in exhibitions throughout 1958 and 1959, and many amateur artists became famous.60 
The national goal was to attain a student body comprising 60-70% peasant-class 
students within five years; by 1958, 80% of the entering class were of the worker or 
peasant class, and all but the old or weak artists were required to engage in manual 
labor in the countryside.61   While the Chinese communist revolution was largely 
centered on the glorification of peasants, and indeed had its roots in the rural 
population, the intelligentsia were still necessary  for their administrative and technical 
talents, creation of art and literature, and scapegoating in the event  of policy 
breakdown.  So, a major objective in art policy was not just to promote economic 
goals, but also ideological goals; namely to promote proletarian consciousness among 
the intelligentsia and reduce the gap between the urban educated and the rural 
peasantry.  Evidence suggests that these goals met with very  limited success. Kenneth 
Lieberthal writes in Governing China, “Despite intensive political indoctrination, the 
intelligentsia continued to regard most cadres from the countryside as bumpkins.  The 
peasants, in turn, regarded intellectuals as elitist  and ‘bourgeois’”62  Obviously, this 
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contact between artists and writers and peasants did not have the intended effect. 
Forcing artists and writers to appreciate and glorify peasants was a factor in their 
growing disillusionment with the Communist régime.  Intellectuals wanted to support 
the party and support Socialism, but the spirit was killed as soon as they were forced 
to study the peasantry up close and found ignorance, prejudice, and superstition.63 
 Another major change for artists and writers during the Great Leap Forward 
was due to the Sino-Soviet  split: the deliberate distancing from Soviet arts theory  and 
the introduction of Chairman Mao’s new artistic and literary theory, revolutionary 
romanticism.  Mao considered socialist realism inadequate and called for its 
replacement with this new, more visionary style.  Stefan Landsberger, the noted 
collector and propaganda poster scholar writes in Chinese Propaganda Posters: 
Revolution to Modernization, “Clearly, the non-Soviet element of romanticism was 
introduced to make the arts more visionary, in order to imbue the population with the 
necessary  spirit  of self-sacrifice, hope and enthusiasm to overcome concrete obstacles 
by pure will power.  At the same time, this eliminated the inappropriate gloominess 
often found in ‘pure’ Soviet  Socialist Realism.”64  One argument in favor of this new 
policy was that revolutionary romanticism raises the quality of creative writing 
because it allowed some scope for the imagination.65 While this statement is true, this 
by no means equaled increased artistic freedom.  Works from this era were particularly 
divorced from reality.  The disconnect inherent in revolutionary  romantic images 
portraying prosperity  during the economic disaster of the Great Leap Forward was 
another factor in the growing disillusionment among intellectuals with communist 
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party  leadership.  The stories and poems that praised the Great Leap Forward 
exemplify  a point at which actual reader preferences (what readers wanted to read) and 
prescribed reader preferences (what the Party wanted readers to read) diverged and 
called revolutionary idealism into question.66 In short, the Great Leap Forward, with 
its massive economic collapse and human tragedy coupled with its idealized 
representations of prosperity and growth was the point at which most artists and 
writers began to see flaws in its Party’s directives. 
 By 1960, two years after the Great Leap  Forward began, an estimated 16.5 to 
40 million had died67, and flaws in the Great Leap  Forward were unequivocally 
apparent.  The policies that led to this disaster were reevaluated throughout 1961-1965 
and many were cancelled.  Fine arts institutions began to encourage professionalism 
over amateurism, creating a period of renewed activity for China’s professional 
artists.68 The period after the Great Leap Forward and before the Cultural Revolution, 
called the “period of relaxation” or “period of consolidation,” was a generally liberal 
and prolific time for both art  and literature.  For writers, this was a good time because 
political controls were unusually loose.  Many  writers whom the party had labeled 
“rightists” in 1957 had that stigma removed; in addition, a movement towards the use 
of “middle characters” (characters who were neither bad nor good—generally  frowned 
upon for strict  socialist realist/revolutionary  romantic works) allowed for the 
production of more representative literature, i.e. literature that better corresponded to 
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actual reader preferences.69  Artists used the liberal atmosphere to promote the political 
correctness of using traditional artistic forms like guohua for ideological purposes. 
Artists still had to serve their political purposes, but during this period, their methods 
were increasingly diverse.  A fascinating and eerily beautiful example of guohua being 
used for propaganda purposes is Celebrate the Success of Our Atomic Bomb Explosion 
by Wu Hufan (Figure 15), which was conspicuously a testament to both China’s 
newfound technological prowess as well as self-reliance, having not depended on the 
Soviet Union for nuclear technology. 
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Figure 15: Wu Hufan, Celebrate 
the Success of Our Atomic Bomb 
Explosion, 1965
 Famine, economic disaster, break off from the Soviets, and the reorganization 
of Great Leap Forward policies in 1961 allowed for an oasis of creativity  among 
China’s artists and writers resulting in exhibitions, liberalization of editorial policy  in 
the journal meishu, and a surge in landscape painting production.70  This respite had 
the effect of fostering factionalism in art and literary circles as well as in government. 
With the massive failure that was the Great Leap Forward looming over him, Mao can 
either blame his own policies or blame other, more nebulous factors that allegedly 
corrupted his goals like reactionary  bourgeois influences in the arts and science, the 
ideology of bourgeoisie infiltrating the bureaucracy, flaws in the educational system, 
and reformist tendencies among his political rivals.  
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The Rise of Jiang Qing and the Yangbanxi
“当这种新文学，新语言， 新文艺出现时，也有片刻新鲜感， 但最终
掩盖不了其自身的贫乏和苍白。当时最新鲜的语言， 很快就令人们感到乏味， 
久而久之感到缺氧， 窒息。” 71                                          
    －杨建著， 《文化大革命中的地下文学》
In late 1966, the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee, as well as 
magazines, newspapers, art  and literary  journals, and book publishers were either co-
opted by the Cultural Revolution Group, of which Jiang Qing was then deputy Chief, 
or disassembled outright.  It is an historical irony that at the beginning of Jiang Qing’s 
involvement in the Communist party  in the 1930s, one of her functions was to protect 
“…modern artists from the KMT’s [Nationalist Party] crude censorship  of unorthodox 
books, their destruction of avant-garde art, suppression of innovative films, and 
curtailment of liberal education.”72  How was it that a lover of drama, fan of Western 
films, a defender of the arts, and a once celebrated actress became the chief 
henchwoman responsible for one the most culturally oppressed periods in Chinese 
history?  
For reasons that will be detailed below, reliable early accounts of Jiang Qing’s 
early life and career are rare; however, by  the early 1930s, she was already  part of 
early communist movements fueled by  resentful and often poverty stricken youths 
committed to anti-Japanese imperialism and proletarian class consciousness.  She was 
involved in “guerilla performances” to raise money to support resistance activities, as 
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well as educational programs that were actually communist education programs in 
disguise. Part of her role in the Party  was to teach night school at  the Young Women’s 
Christian Association (YWCA), the activities of which had little to do with 
Christianity, and much to do with anti-imperialist, communist political education. 
Despite the protection offered by the YWCA’s prominent international profile, Jiang 
Qing participated in these movements at great personal risk.  She was, in fact, 
imprisoned by the GMD in 1934 for suspected underground communist  activities. 
Differing accounts of how she managed to escape serious punishment reveal that 
information regarding her early life is unreliable.  In the canonical biography of Jiang 
Qing, Comrade Chiang Ch’ing, written by Roxanne Witke and based on numerous 
interviews, Jiang Qing maintains that she relied on her foreign contacts within the 
YWCA to get  out of jail as a last resort.73   In Ten Year History of the Cultural 
Revolution, however, Yan Jiaqi and Gao Gao write that Jiang Qing was released only 
after having written the following confession: “I have never participated in the 
Communist Party.  Communism does not conform to the Chinese national character, 
and in the future I absolutely  will not participate in Communism.”74  Perhaps the truth 
is somewhere in the middle; after her foreign contact guaranteed her innocence, she 
was required to sign a standard anti-communist document before being allowed to 
leave.  In any case, Jiang Qing is certainly  reluctant to mention that detail later in her 
career.
In 1937, she moved to Yan’an, acting and teaching at the Lu Xun Academy of 
Literature and Arts.  By 1938, she was living with Mao, and they  married in 1939. 
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She was his fourth wife.  Their marriage was from the beginning politically 
controversial.  Because party activities were not centralized and generally  poorly 
organized, Jiang Qing’s party  history was unverifiable and thereby suspect.  Coupled 
with her status as an actress (a suspicious class, often associated with criminals, 
itinerants, and prostitutes), it is clear that many did not approve of Mao and Jiang 
Qing’s marriage.  Both because of her dubious political status and Mao’s 
discouragement, she was initially  not involved in land reform, and had difficulty 
gaining acceptance among Mao’s contemporaries.  After an extended illness and 
convalescence in the USSR, in 1949 she finally gained the opportunity  to participate 
in promoting land reform, along with the wives of other leaders.  In 1950, she engaged 
in the censorship of sensitive films, eventually  attaining the position of Director of the 
Cinema Department of the Propaganda Department.  In Witke’s biography, an inside 
account of how a Hong Kong film, Inside Story of the Qing Court, came to be banned 
gives an interesting glimpse into the process of censorship during this early period. 
Surprisingly, the process itself was not unilateral.  The relative merits and flaws of the 
film were the subject of meetings of cultural administrators, writers, and historians 
who, in theory, were to collectively decide the whether the film was to be banned or 
continue to be allowed to show.  Unsurprisingly, however, when the collective 
conclusion failed to support Jiang Qing’s initial opinion, she used her personal 
authority to ban the film anyway.75  
During the most of the 1950s, Jiang Qing played no major political role.  Due 
to a combination of health problems, the pressures of her administrative duties, and the 
power politics of ambitious political rivals, Jiang Qing was sequestered in Moscow 
with limited access to political news and cultural materials from 1951-1953.   As her 
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condition worsened with what Chinese doctors would diagnose as cervical cancer in 
1956, she was forced to return to Moscow for radiation treatments, from which she 
would recover in 1959.   During her recovery, her doctor recommended that she see 
shows to keep her mind off of her physical condition.  Her shock and anger at what 
she perceived as deeply problematic “ancient and bourgeois plays” inspired her to 
concentrate on her recovery so that she could devote herself entirely to cultural 
work.76  The result  three years later in 1962 was the influential “May 16th Circular,” a 
prelude to the Cultural Revolution; and four years after that the Second May 16th 
Circular, which essentially set the Cultural Revolution in motion politically. Her 
involvement in these pre-Cultural Revolution activities would prepare her to be on the 
forefront of cultural policy  making. It was during a “Military  Art and Literary Workers 
Talks Summary” meeting, February 2-20, 1966, that  Jiang Qing first announced to the 
military, the party, and the country  that arts policy would be under her guidance from 
then on; she thus, “…became the leader of the Cultural Revolution and mounted the 
stage of Chinese government.”77
How was it that Jiang Qing, who was not only  largely  excluded from cultural 
policy-making since marrying Mao Zedong up  until 1966, when she was named 
advisor to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), became the leading figure on cultural 
work?    Complete domination of cultural policy, which Jiang Qing wielded during the 
Cultural Revolution, was predicated on her ability to supersede Peng Zhen, mayor of 
Beijing who opposed her early efforts to establish model operas, Liu Shaoqi, Chief of 
State who was later labeled “traitor” and “capitalist roader,” and Lin Biao, leader of 
the PLA.  Jiang Qing was not able to advance any of her policies without an official 
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high rank, which she attained from Lin Biao in the PLA in exchange for influence she 
might have with the Chairman.78  
Along with a no doubt genuine desire to reform the arts to serve socialist goals, 
Jiang Qing had other designs once she attained political power: to erase evidence of 
her dubious past and retaliate against her past enemies.  Among her first actions was to 
have her 1930s history cleared away by intimidating previous acquaintances into 
destroying old pictures and other materials, systematically using her power to subject 
old rivals to criticisms or imprisonment, and having their houses sacked by Red 
Guards, eventually having them burned.  Yan and Gao write in Ten Year History of the 
Cultural Revolution, “Jiang Qing always had a special relationship with her 1930s 
Shanghai contemporaries in the drama industry, and they  all knew her deep secrets; as 
a result, therefore one by one their mouths were shut as they met with struggle 
sessions and labor reform.”79  Though her roles as an actress undoubtedly contributed 
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Figure 16: Artist Unknown, The 
invincible thought of Mao Zedong 
illuminates the stage of revolutionary 
art!, Late 60s,
to her political mystique and charismatic personality, it is ironic that Jiang Qing spared 
no effort to divorce herself from her movie star past.
Jiang Qing also used her political power for retribution.  Control over film and 
opera meant that she had the ability  to decide whose works could be singled out for 
criticism.  As a result of systematic censorship and ideological attacks, she could use a 
combination of official channels and Red Guard mob force to ensure that the influence 
of her enemies from her early career would be erased.  These enemies, Tian Han, Xia 
Yan, Yang Hansheng, and Zhou Yang, labeled the “Four Villains,” were condemned, 
and forced to parade around with a sign around their neck with their names literally 
stricken through.  Even drawing attention to her acting past in a positive manner was 
taboo, as one unfortunate film critic who praised her role in the film Blood on Wolf 
Mountain in a film encyclopedia found out.  He was targeted during the Cultural 
Revolution.80  Besides erasing her past and enacting vengeance, Jiang Qing had very 
specific ideas about how arts policy should complement Mao’s political goals.  The 
most important theoretical concept that shaped Jiang Qing’s policies was that 
entertainment that contained references to “feudal” Chinese life, superstitions, and 
“demons and ghosts” would produce backward, superstitious citizens.   Modern 
entertainment that glorified bourgeois, Western lifestyles (like that  of Shanghai in the 
1930s, in Jiang Qing’s mind) would produce citizens without proletarian 
consciousness.  Her solution to the problem in late 1966 was to ban all theatre and film 
productions and replace them with her model works, the yangbanxi.
According to Yang Jianzhu in Underground Literature of the Cultural 
Revolution (Wenhuadageming zhongde dixia wenxue), there were 327 plays and 
operas widely performed in 1965.  He writes, “Among these [327 plays and operas], 
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there were 122 plays, 33 operas, 76 Beijing style-operas, 96 local-style operas, and 10 
other kinds.  Among these 327 works, 137 were large scale productions, and 190 were 
small to medium size productions.”81  When the Cultural Revolution formally began, 
and the Cultural Revolution group  gained control over play, opera, and film 
production, over the period of ten years, there were only  a handful.  The yangbanxi 
generally  refers to the “original” eight model operas, ballets, and symphony that were 
produced in the first two years of the Cultural Revolution, but  there were a few other 
model works produced later in the Cultural Revolution as well.  The original eight 
model works include two ballets: The Red Detachment of Women (Hongse niangzi jun) 
and The White-Haired Girl (Bai mao nv); five Beijing operas: Shajiabang, Sweeping 
the White Tiger Regiment (Qixi baihutuan), Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy (Zhiqu 
weihushan), The Harbor (Haigang), and The Legend of the Red Lantern 
(Hongdengji); and one symphony, Shajiabang. 
 In creating the yangbanxi, Jiang Qing emphasized destruction over creation.  It 
was not  only her intention to eliminate feudal and bourgeois influences in the 
entertainment sphere, but  also most of the traditions and social institutions that 
supported negative influences.  As a result of her policies, individuality, realism, and 
innovation were replaced with communal action, revolutionary romanticism, and 
aesthetics that were by the end of the Cultural Revolution considered banal.  Much the 
way poster artists used traditional styles with historical and cultural precedent in 
woodcuts and new years art, the dramas of the Cultural Revolution exploited the 
dominant style of traditional Chinese opera.  Certain elements of traditional dramatic 
style were preserved in the yangbanxi, to accommodate the tastes of the target 
audience, that is the masses, many of whom had never been exposed to styles of drama 
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outside the traditional regional dramas.  Similarly, Western influences mainly in the 
area of music (the symphony Shajiabang is essentially  a Western-style symphony) and 
stage production techniques were not categorically rejected.  Jiang Qing seemed to 
have embraced the philosophy of "…in our hands these old forms are reconstructed 
and filled with new content, so that they also become revolutionary  and serve the 
people.”82  Jiang Qing gave her specifications to commissioned professional writers 
either to create new dramas based on recent revolutionary history, or to modify older 
dramas to conform to the new aesthetic of the proletarian arts.   Actors were also 
expected to maintain an intimate connection with the masses for whom they were to 
perform.  Witke writes, “To spread Communist ideology and to narrow the class 
breach between professional artists and working people, troupe members typically 
were divided into four teams that were dispatched to perform among workers and 
peasants on a rotating basis. The same format was aggressively and broadly used 
during the Cultural Revolution.”83 
 The yangbanxi glorified the proletariat, Mao Zedong Thought, and the Party. 
None of the settings in any of the ballets or operas predates the CCP.  Though an epic 
portrayal of the Long March or some other historically significant Communist 
accomplishment would seem to thematically fit into the model works, no landmark 
events and no powerful political individuals such as Mao himself appear in the model 
works.  This was almost certainly because no actor was up to the task of portraying the 
Great Helmsman to the standards of the deified leader portrayed in other forms of 
propaganda.   Though Mao himself was not  portrayed on stage, unmistakable allusions 
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to his presence such as his quotations, or imagery of the rising sun are common.  The 
aesthetics of the operas bear a strikingly (but not surprisingly) strong resemblance to 
those of propaganda poster images.  The characters are either unfaltering heroes or 
unmitigated evildoers; their heroic poses often prominently feature their fists, as 
opposed to the delicate, elegant hand gestures of traditional opera; and their gaze is 
frequently upraised and hopeful.  The similarities between the different forms of 
media, operas, ballets, posters, and literature are a testament to the homogenizing 
influence of arts policy in Mao’s China.
 The ballets incorporate a number of styles, including traditional folk dance and 
international ballet  as well as the aesthetics of socialist realism.  The aesthetics are 
manifest in the colors that dominate the stage, the poses and gaze of the actors, as well 
as its ideological content.  The color red, the symbolic color of the communist party, is 
used frequently, primarily as an emphasis on ideological purity of certain characters. 
In The Red Detachment of Women, Wu Jinghua, the female protagonist, wears a bright 
red shirt even while she is still a slave, symbolizing her inner revolutionary spirit. 
Similarly  in The White-Haired Girl, Xi’er wears a full costume of red, not only 
helping to differentiate her from other dancers on an often-crowded stage, but also 
showing her revolutionary potential.  The use of color is particularly interesting in The 
White-Haired Girl.  In the ballet, red is the traditional color of happiness and joy 
during the New Years season, but it is also the modern referent to the glory of the 
Communist Party. When she hides in the mountains, she loses color: her hair turns 
white, and clothes are also devoid of color, representing not only her separation from 
society, but also an ideological void waiting to be filled. When she joins the 
revolution, going back to her town to confront her oppressors, she is given a red scarf 
to cover her white hair as a red sun breaks through the clouds, and a red sun later rises 
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to be worshipped after the evil landlords are executed.84  The color black, the symbol 
for negative social elements, is often found on villainous characters like landlords. 
This red/black dichotomy is consistent  with the political labels of five black categories 
(heiwulei) (landlords, rich-farmers, anti-revolutionists, bad elements, and right-
wingers) and five red categories (revolutionary cadres, workers, poor peasants, 
families of martyrs, and families of the military) used during the Cultural Revolution.
 The heroic poses actors make on the stage are a stylistic holdover from 
traditional opera.  In the model ballets, heroic poses mark important moments, often 
turning points in the narrative.  It is a notable phenomenon because it simultaneously 
demonstrates the influence of dramatic tradition as well as socialist realist aesthetics. 
An interesting by-product of the heroic pose is a moment of parallel between 
performance propaganda and propaganda posters, particularly with regard to the 
characters’ gaze and the prominence of fists or weapons.  (See Figure 17).  
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     Figure 17: Xi'er from The White-Haired Girl , 1972, and the poster Promote the 
spirit of internationalism 1965
During these moments, the actor’s head is almost always turned upward, gaze fixed on 
a distant horizon, a posture associated with revolutionary fervor in propaganda images. 
The gaze either conveys a spirit  of resistance, a feeling of hope, or both.  In The Red 
Detachment of Women, this “hopeful gaze” precedes every  act of resistance during Wu 
Jinghua’s initial escape.85  When the leader of the red detachment of women, Hong 
Zhangjing is shot and captured and also when he is martyred by being burned at  the 
stake  he maintains a fixed, determined stare at the horizon, his fist raised in defiance. 
In The White-Haired Girl, Xi’er poses, brandishing her fist  after her father Yang 
Bailao is killed.86  The young male protagonist, Wang Dachun, who later becomes an 
Eighth Route Army leader, poses with an axe and revolutionary  determination after 
henchmen kidnap his love interest for the landlord.87   Though it  is clear he wants to 
fight against the landlord, he is unsure how to proceed until an old man takes out the 
Eighth Route Army flag.  The celebrated communist military division represents the 
path to salvation from despair for the young man, and the revelation is accompanied 
by a change in dance and music to a more militant style.   The end of the sequence is 
marked by a march and a group pose like that described above.88
 One of the most important aspects common to all of the model works is their 
ideological content.    In some instances, ideology  is manifested in extremely obvious 
ways, such as through the use of slogans.  In The Red Detachment of Women, the 
slogan, “Only after liberating all of mankind can one finally liberate the proletarian 
self. –Mao Zedong” This quotation constitutes a summation of the overall message of 
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the ballet; only after understanding this message is Wu Jinghua re-armed.  Likewise in 
The White-Haired Girl, the cast sing “Mao, our beloved savior, he is our great  sun” as 
the red sun rises.  In content if not form, the model works are identical to the other art 
forms of this period, which is indicative of the aesthetic uniformity of the age. 
Ideological content could also take most subtle forms.  In an interview, Xue Qinghua 
who played Xi’er in The White-Haired Girl, describes how through makeup and 
camera angles, her character was made to appear fat and healthy.89  These methods 
intended to show that contrary to reality, even poor peasant characters were well-fed. 
The ballet The White-Haired Girl departs considerably from the original opera written 
by He Jingzhi published in 1944-45 and the version filmed in 1951.  Though both the 
opera and the story are fundamentally  anti-feudal and pro-communist, the ballet 
version concentrates on the injustices of landlordism and glory of reform under 
communist auspices at the expense of a treatment of a number of other issues like 
sexual abuse that  are discernible in the opera.  For example, in the ballet, the landlord 
fails to rape Xi’er, while in the story  he impregnates her.  With the addition of rape at 
the hands of the landlord, the resulting child, and the social consequences for Xi’er, 
the opera is a more complex, variegated treatment of the injustices of feudalism.  
 Aesthetically, the model operas are similar to the ballets.  In Taking Tiger 
Mountain by Strategy, one finds many  features that are both typical of Beijing opera 
and subtly influenced by socialist realism.  For example, delicate hand gestures are 
traded for aggressive fists; actions like crying and sorrow were changed to reflect, “…
how the working class cries;”90 and a riding crop  or a gun with a red streamer takes the 
place of a spear; the traditional roles in Beijing opera were only loosely filled; and the 
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drums, gongs and cymbals were accompanied by western instruments.  As in the 
ballets, color has important symbolic value: Chang, the peasant girl who joins the 
Liberation Army trades her peasant clothes for red clothes, for example.  Characters on 
the stage are generally  organized according to Jiang Qing’s “Three Prominences,” that 
is that among the masses, positive characters should stand out, among these positive 
characters there should be heroes, and among these heroes there should be 
superheroes.  Evil characters are never allowed to advance to the front  of the stage 
(see Figure 18).   Subtlety is not a virtue when it comes to the ideological implications 
of the yangbanxi. Artifice was frowned upon, and simplicity was a virtue compatible 
with the needs of the masses.  Straightforward storytelling, archetypal characters, and 
socialist realist aesthetics all played a part in ensuring that the propaganda message 
was understood and internalized. 
 Having exclusively dominated the performing arts sphere for all of the Cultural 
Revolution, Jiang Qing’s yangbanxi were profoundly influential.  Yet this influence 
did not necessarily correspond with Jiang Qing’s expectations or intentions.  The 
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Figure 18:  Yang Zuzhong dominates the 
front of the stage while the villains cower 
behind him.  Taking Tiger Mountain By 
Strategy, 1970
yangbanxi had many implications that she did not expect.  Perhaps the most important 
unintended effect of total control of the media was an unprecedented surge in the 
popularity of oral literature and other underground fiction.  The trend was not only 
fueled by the lack of official, sanctioned entertainment, but also by the monotonous 
lifestyle of young intellectuals sent to the countryside. In Underground Literature of 
the Cultural Revolution Yang writes, “For researchers of Cultural Revolution history 
and the movement of young intellectuals to the countryside, the emergence of young 
intellectual song and poetry materials is precious—a genuine record of the reality of 
the Cultural Revolution.”91   Young intellectuals in the countryside, many of whom 
were the most fanatic supporters of the Cultural Revolution, grew disillusioned with 
both socialist ideology  and the promises of collectivized rural economy, as 
increasingly  evident in their poetry.  Underground literature represents catharsis in a 
monotonous and regimented life because it offers complexity and richness not found 
in the Cultural Revolution-era orthodox media: the conflict of human emotions, 
instability, and injustice.  The Second Handshake by  Zhang Yang is an example of this 
kind of underground story  written during the Cultural Revolution; it was so popular 
that it continued to be copied and rewritten, from a 5,000 character version in 1964 to 
an 80,000 character version in 1973 and was ultimately published aboveground in 
1979.92  
 The model works have had a lasting influence on those who saw them 
repeatedly during the Cultural Revolution, and for this reason remain popular to this 
day.  The works are not popular for the reasons Jiang Qing might have hoped, 
however.  In 2005, Hetty Naaijken--Retel Helmrich/Scarabee Films, a film production 
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company from the Netherlands, produced a documentary called Yangbanxi, which 
followed ex-performers and interviewed fans in order to examine the durability of the 
yangbanxi’s influence.  In one particularly trenchant interview, Xu Yuhui, a modern 
artist and fan of the yangbanxi explains why they were so popular at the time, “They 
[the model works] are deeply ingrained in my memory.  When we watched the 
performances as youths, there were no other performances, only yangbanxi, so 
naturally  they had a deep impact on us.  We watched them quite happily… of course 
there was nothing else to watch.”93  Later in the interview he gives other insights into 
the popularity of the yangbanxi: for him it was the yangbanxi that gave meaning to the 
revolution, but for very unexpected reasons:
Xu: I liked them all, but  I liked The Red Detachment of Women in 
particular.
Interviewer:  Why that one in particular?
Xu:  Because…well because…they wore very little…they wore 
comparatively  little clothing!  Well…there were…their thighs…with 
those stockings, their thighs peeked out.  When we were young we 
were just beginning to have desires for the opposite sex starting with 
the yangbanxi.  We found that in the midst of the Cultural Revolution 
there was something real and lively.  That's how I understood the 
yangbanxi.94
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Art and Literature of the Cultural Revolution
“’Scar literature’ only tells two-fifths of the whole story.”95
      -Anonymous Engineer from Guangzhou 
    
 The ten-year “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” widely recognized as 
“the ten lost years” was a movement with causes and implications so complex that 
they  defy summation.  Nevertheless, an understanding of the basic mentality  behind 
the movement is critical to understanding the propaganda media of the era and its 
effects.  At the simplest level, the Cultural Revolution was a movement that Mao set in 
motion in order to consolidate his power, by  removing competition and regaining 
control over cultural expression.  Though Chinese historians generally recognize 1966 
as the official beginning of the Cultural Revolution, warning signs of a severe 
crackdown on “reformist,” “liberal,” or “bourgeois” tendencies began in 1963 with the 
Socialist Education Movement.  The purpose of the movement was to discourage 
liberal attitudes in the bureaucracy.  This movement was abandoned in 1966 in favor 
of a more extreme solution to Mao’s problem of perceived rivals in the party.  On May 
16th, 1966 Jiang Qing, under Mao’s direction, produced a paper entitled the “Second 
May 16th Circular,” which criticized Party Deputy Chairman Liu Shaoqi and General 
Secretary of the Communist Party Deng Xiaoping for allowing liberal reactionary 
elements take control of the media and being unfaithful to the proletariat.96 Official 
criticism within the party was a serious matter, but it  was only  the beginning of Mao’s 
plans to regain control of culture.  Mao again used broad populist support to legitimize 
his actions; this time he strategically  supported student movements criticizing 
university leadership and founded the Red Guard movement.  Chairman Mao used 
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these activist student supporters to achieve his consolidation over party  and cultural 
control goals by mobilizing them in campaigns to overthrow party bureaucrats who 
were “capitalist roaders,” and to destroy the “four olds”: old ideas, old culture, old 
customs, and the old habits of exploiting the masses.97 Red Guard Factions used this 
policy as justification to criticize, beat, publicly torture and humiliate party 
bureaucrats, professors, and anyone that was critical of the Red Guards’ arbitrary 
methods.  The era was later characterized in (scar) art, (scar) literature, and personal 
accounts to be a most painful and difficult time for the families who were broken up, 
friends who betrayed friends to protect themselves, lovers forced to separate, and 
children “sent-down” to the countryside to uncertain fates, just to name a few themes. 
It was the most fiercely anti-intellectual period in modern Chinese history.
The Red Guard phase of the Cultural Revolution officially ended in 1969 when 
Chairman Mao declared the Cultural Revolution to be finished.  However, the years 
after 1969 until Mao’s death in 1976 are considered part of the Cultural Revolution 
because of the continued criticism campaigns and controls on art  and particularly 
literature.  As a result, the Ministry of Culture, the Chinese Artists Association, and the 
Chinese Writers Association were all effectively defunct and these organizations were 
organized into “propaganda small groups”98; the educational system was completely 
disrupted and all universities closed down; and the communist  party completed the 
monopoly  on information as museums and libraries were closed.  Despite these 
factors, the Cultural Revolution was a particularly prolific time for artists.  However, 
because of the rampant anti-intellectualism of this era, it was a particularly  bad time 
for writers.  Literature during the Cultural Revolution was strictly regulated and 
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produced by committees.99 During the Cultural Revolution, literary journals ceased 
publication.  By 1972, the only literary magazine left publishing was Chinese 
Literature.100 
This fact is significant because it is the first time in Chinese socialist history 
that propaganda art became the most  favored method to transmit  party ideology.101 
The art of the era, though abundant, was severely limited in terms of acceptable styles 
and scope of subjects.  The emphasis was overwhelmingly  on amateur art: technically 
simple with dominant, unambiguous ideological messages.  The smiling image of Mao 
often participates in or overshadows many images, shining over crowds in the form of 
a sun, or represented by red flags or Little Red Books.  “The Chairman Smiles,” an 
online exhibition of political posters from the International Institute of Social History 
gives the following apt description: 
Designers use examples rather than an individual style, as 
individualism is not appreciated.  Experienced designers have to work 
anonymously  or in collectives, or are not allowed to work at all.  Every 
detail has a distinct meaning on the posters.  Gestures and grouping of 
figures in frozen poses often call to mind scenes from the revolutionary 
Beijing Operas.  Red is the dominant colour on almost every poster. 
Every  nuance of the ruling ideology is spread with an incredible 
intensity.102
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In my description of Cultural Revolution art, I focus on three main themes: factional 
struggle and criticisms, the glorification of Mao and Maoist ideology, and the “Three 
Prominences.” 
 Political struggle among the leadership, ostensibly the main reason for the 
Cultural Revolution in the first  place, spilled over among the populace in the form of 
criticisms and poster campaigns.  These campaigns changed the “prevailing ideology” 
so quickly that posters would serve as a main source of information about what topics 
were politically dangerous.  Popularizing these campaigns, mobilizing the masses lent 
political leaders the legitimacy to remove potential rivals for power in the party 
leadership, which included high level figures in the arts (and literary) bureaucracy.103 
One of the main promulgators of factional struggle were the Red Guards, whose ranks 
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 Figure 19: Artist Unknown 
Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers Are 
the Main Force in Criticizing Lin 
Biao and Confucius, 1974
were swelled with university-aged youth following school closures.  Red Guard artists 
were mainly involved in collaborative efforts, sometimes co-opting the skills of an art 
instructor when it came to rendering Chairman Mao’s visage, which required skills 
beyond those of a typical Red Guard artist  who had no formal training.104 Examples of 
Red Guard art typically feature deific portraits of Chairman Mao, the ideological 
weaponry that were his quotations, and caricatures of fallen political leaders.  Each 
Red Guard faction developed its own characteristics and methods, each believing that 
their methods best served Chairman Mao, which often led to conflict of interests, and 
violence. 
 One of the main campaigns to criticize political leaders was the “pilin, pikong” 
campaign, which was an attack on Lin Biao and Confucius, which resulted in many 
interesting posters during the period of a few months in 1973-1974.  The attack on 
Confucius was a veiled attack on what Mao perceived to be reactionary elements (and 
potential rivals for power) in the party: Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping.105  Kenneth 
Lierberthal writes in Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform how Lin 
Biao’s attempted coup ordeal played a role in discrediting both the Cultural 
Revolution and the leadership because the populace felt that the Cultural Revolution 
had been imposed upon them on account of power politics:
Suddenly, though, the propaganda organs put out the story that Lin had 
been a scoundrel all along and that Mao had always understood this. 
Mao had only  seemed to back Lin in order to flush him out and expose 
his true colors….  Even people who had been persuaded to regard Mao 
as virtually a god…did not believe this new story.  Lin’s treachery, 
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whatever it may actually  have been, made cynics of many believers and 
greatly eroded the credibility of the entire leadership and its policies.106
This is early evidence that viewers were not passive subjects; propaganda campaigns 
could actually  bring out the opposite of its intended effects, reflecting the attitude of 
cynicism toward invasive politics that increasingly characterizes the Chinese audience.
 Amid all the factional struggle and policy attacks, one man remained beyond 
reproach: Mao Zedong.  During the Cultural Revolution, Mao’s ubiquitous portraits 
came to symbolize his benevolent  rule and guiding ideology.  He appears continually, 
associated with grandiose landscapes; he is either bathed in the primary light sources 
of the work, or his visage itself represents the shining sun.  If Mao himself is not 
represented, either his Little Red book, a pin with his face on it, or his ideology in the 
form of a quote is likely  to appear.  One of the most famous examples of art 
representing Mao in his heroic, transcendent role is Chairman Mao Goes to Anyuan by 
Liu Chunhua.  Julia Andrews writes, “With the publicity blitz of 1968, however, 
almost every  Chinese with even the remotest interest in art became aware of Chairman 
Mao Goes to Anyuan.  The artist believes that nine hundred million copies were 
eventually printed.”107 This assertion is not difficult to believe, as a copy  of this very 
work hangs above this writer’s desk, 7,000 miles away and 37 years later.  Chairman 
Mao’s Cultural Revolution iconography became so commonplace as to represent not 
just the Cultural Revolution era to later generations, but also zealotry of any sort, as 
evidenced by the commercialization of his image in the 1990s.  
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 The third main theme in Cultural Revolution art is the “Three Prominences,” 
one of Jiang Qing’s revolutionary aesthetic principles.  It was essentially a new 
extreme for socialist realist art beyond socialist realism and beyond revolutionary 
romanticism.  One can see its influences in almost all examples of Cultural 
Revolution-era art: stress the positive (already  a directive in socialist realism), stress 
the heroic (a directive for revolutionary romanticism), and stress the central heroic. 
This “technique” was mainly used to convey a very narrow range of ideologically safe 
subjects, which were politicized, stereotyped, and glorified to the extreme.  Among 
these subjects were the “new socialist things, which included barefoot doctors (a term 
to describe a peasant who got  basic medical training and then returned to the 
countryside and other areas where normal doctors were typically  unavailable), 
revolutionary  committees (political bodies that replaced the structures in place before 
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Figure 20: Liu Chunhua, 
Chairman Mao Goes to Anyuan, 
1968
the Cultural Revolution), and “Up to the mountains, down to the villages” (a widely 
influential rustification campaign).108 
 The effects of Cultural Revolution policies and themes on artists and writers 
were extensive.  Besides the fear and paranoia of everyday  life that all Chinese people 
suffered through, artists and writers, who by  nature of their profession dealt with 
matters of politics and ideology regularly, were in particular danger.  The majority of 
artists and writers busied themselves tending to the precarious task of avoiding attack. 
One of the reasons that Chinese literature includes such a high proportion of short 
stories to full-length novels is that a story could be published before the “prevailing 
ideology” could change, while an entire novel might require too much time.109  The 
primary goal of pragmatic artists became to please the leadership  and to create exalted 
works of art to serve as “political capital” to protect him from future shifts in policy.110 
Despite their cooperation with Cultural Revolution policies, intellectuals in general 
were persecuted in this era.  In 1970 all artists and writers were ordered to be “sent-
down” to the countryside for peasant and military experience.  The artists spent nearly 
all of their time performing manual labor, leaving little chance to paint or write.  Being 
“sent-down” was a common-place phenomenon during the Cultural Revolution. 
Xiaobing Tang writes in Chinese Modern, "During the 1960s and 1970s, the 
ideologically  sanctioned method of overcoming the difference between town and 
country…was to suppress non-farm employment or deurbanize society as a whole.  A 
deeply entrenched agrarian tradition helped to justify an essentially anti-urban policy 
of modernization without urbanization, for urbanism was more often than not 
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identified and condemned as the embodiment of evil modern capitalism."111 Regular 
citizens increasingly were subjected to the kind of treatment that in previous decades 
had been reserved for intellectuals.  This fact contributed to sympathy toward 
intellectuals and a general hatred the Chinese people had for intrusive political 
movements in the decades following the Cultural Revolution.  
 If an artist did happen to produce a work that did not fall within the narrow 
scope of acceptability, it was likely to be the basis for an attack.  The purpose of the 
attack was not necessarily to punish artists—criticizing “black art” was one way  in 
which Jiang Qing attacked Zhou Enlai in order to consolidate her claim on succession. 
Zhou Enlai supported exporting non-political (generally landscape) art to improve 
China’s international image.  Jiang Qing selected paintings on the basis of being 
apolitical or catering to foreign tastes for criticism; even unpublished works were not 
immune from criticism.  Jiang Qing claimed that maintaining a double standard in art 
was “counter-revolutionary.”112  One form of attack was a “Black Art Exhibition.” 
Artists and their paintings were selected to serve as negative exemplars and warnings 
to other artists.  In this way, even artists serving their duty  to political leaders (namely, 
producing apolitical art for Zhou Enlai’s purposes) could be at risk of being labeled a 
counter-revolutionary and having to perform self-criticisms.  The fact that the liberal 
faction (Zhou Enlai) wanted to export art and that the most conservative elements 
(Jiang Qing) were so fervently against the idea indicates that foreign views were an 
important consideration at the time.  Art could be a natural bridge to foreign cultures. 
It has the distinct advantage of not being subject to linguistic barriers; its 
representations are a universal language. 
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 This quality is exactly what made it so appealing to liberal figures and alarming to 
conservative ones.    It is clear from the outpouring of popular support after Zhou 
Enlai’s death in January  1976 that his liberalizing influence was favored among 
ordinary  people.  This display  of populist  support and the related Tian’anmen protest 
in April 1976 was an overt sign that  the Chinese people were more than ready for the 
oppression of the Cultural Revolution to be over.  
 During this time of extreme artistic and literary  control, Chinese people still 
found ways to enjoy fiction with popular, apolitical themes.  “Hand copied 
volumes” (shouchaoben) were a form of underground literature that existed during the 
Cultural Revolution to serve as retroactive insights into the interests of Chinese 
readers at the time.  The themes of popular works were as mundane (to the western 
reader) as detective stories, personal philosophies, poetry, and pornography; yet 
readers and creators of hand-copied volumes could be severely  punished.113  This 
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phenomenon is significant because it represents a possible outlet for writers who 
otherwise had no opportunities to write in this particularly repressive era.  One 
underground work,  “The Second Handshake” was published aboveground in 1979, 
when literary controls were significantly less repressive, and it sold 3.3 million copies 
within a few months.114  Significantly, few underground works were dissident; rather, 
writers simply took the opportunity to express their creativity  and write (generally 
apolitical) stories people found entertaining.
 By the time Chairman Mao died on September 9th, 1976, the Chinese people 
had suffered many disasters as a direct result  of his policies.  Intellectuals had suffered 
particularly harshly.  In order for modernization to occur, the status of the 
intelligentsia needed to undergo a complete re-examination.  Naturally, this is exactly 
what occurred during the “Four Modernizations” era.
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Propaganda of the Four Modernizations Era- Reform and Opening-Up Era
“Cities these days, like women, are just beginning to pretty themselves up, and 
already there are people who won’t sit still for it.  That’s interesting.115
                                         -Wang Meng, “Eye of the Night” 
The Four Modernizations was primarily  an era of repudiation and 
backpedaling.  As the title of the movement indicates, it was ostensibly an effort  to 
modernize four areas: agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and 
technology. Main objectives included de-collectivizing agricultural production, 
decreasing state-owned enterprises by allowing the formation of joint ventures and 
foreign-owned enterprises, re-establishing educational institutions, and re-
enfranchising intellectuals (previously “rightists”).  In keeping with this theme, 
controls over the media were comparatively slight, allowing for a degree of freedom 
of expression not experienced in China for decades.  Subjects of propaganda were 
generally  urban and/or industrial and reflected new appreciation for modern 
technology.  Targets of propaganda were increasingly  diverse.  Issues of ideology and 
policy were (with the exception of the one-child policy) generally non-invasive, such 
as education, morality, and safety.  The role of political leaders in propaganda was 
vastly  reduced as political leadership became less cabalistic and satisfied to govern 
from behind the scenes.
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 After Mao’s death in September 1976, Hua Guofeng succeeded him as party 
Chairman.  Practically his first  order of business was to imprison “The Gang of Four:” 
Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan, Zhang Chunqiao, and Wang Hongwen.  Despite this 
momentous victory for artists and writers to whom the Gang of Four represented the 
most conservative and pernicious oppressors of originality, in neither the art world nor 
the literary world was there an immediate outpouring of creative new works.  This is 
for three principle reasons.  First, artists and writers had long since learned from the 
Anti-Rightist movement and the Cultural Revolution to be cautious and distrustful 
when it came to change, particularly  when change was in their favor.  Liberalizing 
trends could just as likely be traps as they  could be windfalls.  Secondly, the new 
Chairman Hua was certainly an improvement over Chairman Mao in almost  every 
practical aspect; however, Chairman Hua, perhaps in an attempt to secure legitimacy 
from remaining conservative elements of the party, actively  maintained the same kind 
of image that Chairman Mao did.  The posters that bear Chairman Hua’s image, in 
many cases completely  interchangeable with posters that bore Chairman Mao’s image, 
best evidence this fact (See Figure 22).  Lastly, artists and writers had out of self-
preservation developed specific ways of producing art in order to stay under the 
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Figure 22: Cheng Lizhi, Closely Unite Around the Party Central 
Committee with Chairman Hua At the Head to Strive for New 
Victories 1977
conservative (and punitive) radar.  Self-censorship had been a significant factor in 
artistic and literary creation for decades, and continues to be a significant factor to this 
day.  Moreover, many artists, particularly those educated during the Cultural 
Revolution, had been educated about certain state-approved techniques only, and 
therefore did not have a proper basis to be more expressive.  The lack of stylistic 
variation is not  surprising due to the homogenizing influences of Cultural Revolution-
era artistic (non)developments, though the themes in art were increasingly 
apolitical.116  The year 1978 was the beginning of Deng Xiaoping’s political primacy 
as well as the beginning of Chinese economic reforms, and the year roughly 
corresponded with genuinely expressive works.  It  would take a few years of liberal, 
opening-up  policies, palpable evidence of decreased political control over private life, 
and a few heroic writers to “test the waters” and publish risky works first. 
 Perry Link cites Liu Xinwu’s “The Homeroom Teacher” (published November 
1977) and Lu Xinhua’s “Scar” (published August 1978) as two landmark works to 
“break significantly into forbidden zones.”117 These two works, “Scar” in particular, 
were responsible starting an entire genre of literature and art that released pent-up 
resentment at  having suffered the extremes of the Cultural Revolution and previous 
punitive movements.  Stefan Landsberger indicates that Lu Xinhua’s “Scar” was partly 
responsible for the end of socialist realism as the “sole principle of creation in Chinese 
art,” and the new use of “flashback styles” in painting and propaganda art.118  It was 
not until Autumn 1979 at the Fourth Congress of the All-China Federation of 
Literature and Art Workers that there were concrete changes in arts policy.  There were 
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two significant  policy changes.  First, around this time “art in service of politics,” a 
policy that had dominated since the Yan’an Talks disappeared from the media, later to 
be replaced by  the more flexible “Literature in Service of the People and Socialism.” 
Second, artists and writers were assured that the extreme abuses of the Cultural 
Revolution, i.e. “cudgeling” (personal attacks), “capping” (labeling, like “Anti-
Rightist”), and “grabbing of pigtails” (citing small errors to ruin one’s reputation), 
would all end.119 
 Why did the Chinese government decide to relax controls over artists, writers, 
and intellectuals in general?  After all, though Mao had died, he was an ideological 
pillar in the communist party.  Later leaders would use his quotations and philosophies 
as legitimizing factors, as leaders still use them today.120  With the infrastructure for 
control already in place, why was control reduced?  One reason is that modernization 
was a primary priority.  Just like during the economic reforms of the early 1950s, 
China needed to mobilize the intelligentsia because modernization necessitated their 
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Figure 23: Artist Unknown, Smash the Gang of 
Four, 1978
technical and creative skills.  The communist party realized that attacks on artists and 
writers caused scientists and engineers to fear the universal anti-intellectual 
atmosphere that  pervaded the Cultural Revolution era.121  Therefore, to secure the 
cooperation of intellectuals in the sciences, the party needed to improve its 
relationship  with artists and writers significantly.  The change also reflected a 
conscious decision to shift focus from political struggle to economic/modernization 
struggle.  
Another reason reducing restrictions on arts and literature was advantageous to 
the communist party is that by giving tacit approval to criticize former leaders, 
aspiring leaders could discredit  any  of their supporters who might be rivals for power. 
Deng Xiaoping welcomed criticism of the Gang of Four, “…so long as it did not go so 
far as to call into question the basic legitimacy of the regime he was inheriting.”122 
Artistically this was a delicate balance of maintaining the previous leadership’s 
(Mao’s) image as a legitimizing factor for the CCP and at the same time repudiating 
the harmful mistakes of the past.  In this way, contemporary leadership  was able to 
acknowledge the tarnishing of the Party’s image but also to shift focus from past 
mistakes and concentrate on modernization.
 A third explanation for the liberalization in the arts is that it was a natural 
consequence of increased global awareness and economic reforms resulting from 
Deng Xiaoping’s policies in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s.  Some are quick 
to cite growth of the Chinese economy and increasing global awareness to explain the 
decline of the propaganda machine and the socialist literary system.  After all, 
economic growth and globalism are palpable facts, readily  observable, and widely 
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celebrated as a logical approach to explaining increased liberties-- especially  when 
increasing Western influences are also indicated.  To be sure, market demands 
increasingly  dictated the production of art and literature, especially during the 1980s. 
Moreover, the narrowing scope of political involvement in the daily lives of citizens 
during the Four Modernizations era precluded the production of propaganda with 
heavy  political indoctrination themes that characterized the art of previous eras.  But I 
would like to emphasize the role of an under-studied but ultimately critical factor in 
the changing art consumptive atmosphere: viewer preference.123   From spontaneous 
social movements like the Tian’anmen protests on April 5th, 1976 that mourned Zhou 
Enlai’s passing and simultaneously  showed support for his liberal influence, it is clear 
that general popular opinion agreed that the excesses of the Cultural Revolution must 
end quickly and that even those who previously supported the Cultural Revolution had 
long since become cynical about its ideals.  It appears the effectiveness of propaganda 
art and literature had been overemphasized in any  case.  Xiaomei Chen (above) 
dismisses the spirit or content of propaganda posters in order to appreciate them as 
public artwork.124  Moreover, the speed at which writers began to express bitterness 
over the suffering that the Cultural Revolution caused them indicates that the ideals of 
the movement had long since been lost on them; the propaganda had lost its effect  or 
perhaps never had any effect at all.  From this point of view, loosening restrictions on 
arts and literature was not just a strategic move to better exploit the expertise of 
China’s scientists and engineers—it was akin to turning down the heat before the 
water boiled over.  The fact that post-Cultural Revolution political leaders were able to 
maneuver deftly enough to both discredit the leaders who were ostensibly responsible 
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for the excesses of the past and still maintain their own legitimacy is a testament to 
how comfortable Chinese leaders were using the media to manipulate public opinion 
successfully.
 From the standpoint  of the Chinese Communist Party, the leadership had no 
reason to expect that intellectuals would not fall in line with their directives.  In 
previous instances in socialist history  during which the party  persecuted intellectuals, 
intellectuals had always bounced back when the cycle of repression had run its course. 
After the Cultural Revolution, the CCP made certain new assumptions that were 
remarkably  similar to the assumptions Chinese leadership had made throughout 
history, the Cultural Revolution-era excepted: first, that intellectuals and the 
bureaucracy  were partners in effecting social change; second, that intellectuals 
symbolize the moral consciousness of the people and could speak for their desires; and 
third, that achieving modernity  was the goal of the people and that intellectuals could 
lead this cause.125  As it  happened, these assumptions were accurate.  By this time, 
however, intellectuals were very familiar with the concept of cyclical repression and 
freedom.  One reporter says in Evening Chats in Beijing, “When the leadership ‘opens 
up’ and encourages you to talk, this is after it has made a calculation that the benefit of 
appearing to be magnanimous and open-minded will outweigh the damage that the 
free talking will bring.  But when the limits are reached, then that’s it—no more 
talking.”126  Even during this unprecedented period of artistic freedom, intellectuals 
had a cynical understanding of the system in which they operated—an attitude that 
would ultimately prove to be justified.  
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 One genre that the party tolerated, “scar-literature,” portrayed loss, cynicism, 
and pain as a reaction to the Cultural Revolution as well as earlier movements.  The 
name of the genre comes from the title of the story mentioned above, “Scar” by Lu 
Xinhua.  Scar literature was significant for many reasons: its cathartic effect  for 
millions of people who had suffered during the Cultural Revolution and the enormous 
popular support that it created.  Perhaps most importantly, scar literature represented 
literature that people could actually  relate to—the first literature that people really 
wanted to read in over a decade.127 Despite the late 1970s liberal literary  atmosphere, 
it has been observed that “scar literature” did not do the actual tragedy of the Cultural 
Revolution justice.128  Similarly, works of “scar art” were comparatively innocuous 
when compared to the enormity of the event they represent.  Self-censorship had 
always been a main method of control for the Communist Party, so it  is not surprising 
that this deep-seated “instinct” would not immediately disappear.  The control 
mechanisms that were in place were able to exploit  the psychology  of the Cultural 
Revolution era in that writers were concerned for their own safety and unsure as to 
what constituted crossing the line of acceptable expression.  However, there were 
other forces at work.  China, having just opened up to the rest of the world, found 
itself not only being exposed to foreign ideas and products, but  also subject  to the 
scrutiny  of scholars who leapt on the opportunity to find out just what had been going 
on in China during the last few decades.  The Chinese people, who had been 
victimized during the Cultural Revolution, were understandably  reluctant to come out 
about it in a straightforward manner.  A young writer in 1989 said, “’All the world can 
read scar literature,’ she said. ‘Chinese feel embarrassed to admit to others that such 
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uncivilized things happened in China.  It  doesn’t matter that we intellectuals were the 
victims.  We are still embarrassed for China to admit that it happened.’”129  As 
appearance to the outside world became a factor, foreign exposure was not always a 
liberalizing influence—it could also be cause for reservation.  Nevertheless, scar 
literature was a significant development; it signaled the beginning of author-oriented 
literary  production, wherein authors produce what they  wanted and not necessarily 
what they  were told the masses wanted.  Unfortunately, this trend was short lived.  In 
keeping with the oscillating cycle of liberation and repression and with the tradition of 
invoking the desires of the masses, top leadership  in 1980 decided that scar literature 
had served its purpose in discrediting Cultural Revolution ultra-leftists (and stopped 
the pot from boiling over) and that the masses no longer wanted to read depressing 
scar stories; they wanted to hear about the victories and heroes of the Four 
Modernizations.130  This is yet another example of the party leadership using the will 
of the masses to justify control over the media. 
 During this decade of modernization, the targets of propaganda were more 
diverse than during previous movements.  Instead of blanket ideological campaigns, 
the Propaganda Department increasingly chose to target specific groups like youth and 
women.  The way in which certain groups were targeted and portrayed differed 
considerably from previous eras.  For example, intellectuals and workers took on new 
roles in Four Modernizations-era society.  The youth were regarded as the most 
important group  for China’s future progress.  Inherent in this attitude was an 
impression that previous generations had already been “lost” due to disastrous political 
campaigns.  Propaganda posters that targeted youth promoted broad moral values like 
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discipline, respect, and national pride as part of an attempt to create “socialist spiritual 
civilization” (Figure 24).  During a general trend toward hygiene and cleanliness 
throughout the 1980s and continuing to today, children were used as spokes models. 
Perhaps the strategy was to promote the belief that if children can be upright citizens, 
then adults had no excuse not to follow suit.  Other examples encouraged the study of 
science, reading of (state-approved of course) books, and promoting modernization in 
general.  
 Posters that  specifically targeted women were particularly  prevalent in this era. 
In striking contrast with the more egalitarian images of women that Cultural 
Revolution-era posters promulgated, women appear to have been deliberately 
relegated to specific, limited areas of society and commercial sectors.  The women in 
the posters of the 1960s and early 1970s were portrayed as equal partners in 
revolution, toiling alongside men in ideological, military, and agrarian struggle.  Their 
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 Figure 24: Artist Unknown, 
Respect Social Morality, 1984
clothes were asexual in color and form, their hair often tied back in conservative 
braids.  During the Four Modernizations era, on the other hand, images of women 
underwent “refeminization,” a theme reinforced by  the reappearance of clothing in 
subdued colors and patterns generally  recognized as feminine.  In addition, women 
were often portrayed in increasingly domestic roles.  Typical examples included 
women holding up  pots and pans, serving dishes in a restaurant, or performing the 
duties of a nurse. As the economic rehabilitation of China became the CCP’s main 
goal, and productivity was a primary consideration, women were less favored in the 
industrial sphere.  Promoting an egalitarian outlook on women’s status was de-
emphasized.  
 Workers and peasants were less often the targets of propaganda in this era than 
in other eras.  This is because during the Four Modernizations, the focus was on the 
urban, technological, and modern aspects of idealized Chinese society.  In artwork 
regarding workers the concept of labor as a sacrifice for China’s development was 
replaced by more realistic representations.  For comparison, Figure 25 below is a 1972 
depiction of copper miners at work.  Figure 26 is an oil painting of a steel worker in 
1980:                   
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Both are oil paintings depicting workers engaging in strenuous work in mining or 
metalworking.  The differences between the two paintings are vast, and they reflect a 
revolution in how the mundane is represented in Chinese art.  Notice that in Fighting 
in the Copper Mine, the title immediately stresses struggle and sacrifice.  The 
workers’ heroic poses are dynamic and energetic; their gazes are directed toward some 
distant horizon.  They bask in the glow of an unseen light source, their sweat gives 
them a healthful sheen, and their faces reflect their determined revolutionary zeal for 
copper mining.  The miner in the foreground holds his drill as if it were a rifle, and in 
the rock face are the invading Japanese, American imperialists, and all other manner of 
“paper tigers.”  By contrast the worker in Steel and Sweat, perhaps a foreman due to 
the whistle around his neck, sits with his shoulders slumped.  His gaze is undirected, 
even absentminded.  Revolutionary zeal is unmistakably absent.  He sits in the glow of 
a forge, and its harsh light emphasizes the rivulets of sweat and the stains on his shirt. 
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Figure 25: Wu Yunhua, Fighting in the 
Copper Mine, 1972
Figure 26: Guang Yanbo, Steel and 
Sweat, 1980
 
In short, the principle difference between the two works derives from the era in which 
they  were produced: Fighting in the Copper Mine is a socialist-realist work, while 
Steel and Sweat represents a kind of photo-realist oil painting that was popular in the 
1980s.
 Similarly, literary  examples forego the idealized representations of peasantry in 
favor of a more realistic portrayal of their actual conditions.  Interestingly, one story 
written in 1979, “The Girl Who Seemed to Understand” by Liu Zhen131  gives a 
portrayal of peasant consciousness just before the Cultural Revolution, exploring the 
effects of the Great Leap Forward.  It is difficult to say if the portrayal is truly  realist 
or realistic because even the boldest instances of scar literature did not approach a 
truly  realistic representation of Cultural Revolution tragedy.132 Liu describes a peasant, 
Old Man Du, who is so beaten into docility and resignation by the extremes of land 
reform, famine, and exploitation that he develops a sort of psychosis of submission 
and guilt.  The tragedy of his situation is that he is a model peasant: a selfless, hard 
worker, law-abiding, and humble.  He should have been an exemplar for idealist 
communist policies.  However, Old Man Du says, “’I don’t know what 
‘consciousness’ is.  I used to believe in it, but then in 1960 I starved, and got starved 
out of my mind.’”  Later in the story he says, “’All I can do is work my guts out.  I 
don’t know what all that about ‘contribution’ means.’”  Instead, because of the 
corruption and incompetence that epitomized the actual execution of these policies, he 
may as well be a drone, with no concept of purpose, ideals, or goals.
 The relationship  between intellectuals and propaganda changed markedly from 
the Cultural Revolution during the Four Modernizations in that they  were no longer 
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targets of attack.  Four Modernizations-era posters depict intellectuals as important 
figures in China’s development, and as models worthy of emulation.  This trend had 
two goals: advocating and encouraging youth to engage in the sciences and convincing 
intellectuals spurned during the fiercely anti-intellectual movements of the past that 
the political climate was no longer hostile toward them and that they were vital to 
China’s future development and prosperity.  In the poster entitled Make Many 
Contributions to the Four Modernizations in the Same Manner as Jiang Zhuying, an 
optics specialist is pictured and the message overtly indicates that his example is to be 
followed.133  In another poster entitled Prime Minister Zhou Enlai Encourages Us To 
Do Research and published in 1978, Zhou Enlai is pictured among school children 
who appear to be engaging in a project involving remote control models of planes and 
boats.134 
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 Figure 27: Artist Unknown, 
Prime Minister Zhou Enlai 
Encourages Us To Do Research, 
1978
The image is significant not only because it promotes intellectual pursuits but also 
because it uses Zhou Enlai as the spokes person.  By 1978, Zhou had been deceased 
two years.  The CCP had in November of 1978 just reevaluated and legitimized the 
movement in Tian’anmen in 1976 as a correct revolutionary action,135 which had been 
in part a movement to mourn Zhou Enlai’s death as well as the death of his liberalizing 
influence.  It appears that either the publishing date of this poster is incorrect or that 
publishing this poster was an extremely deft maneuver on the part of the leadership to 
capitalize on Zhou’s newly restored reputation.  
 This poster portraying Zhou Enlai represents a then-rare occasion in which a 
political leader appears in a propaganda poster.  Following Chairman Hua’s brief 
primacy in the party, the de-facto leader was Deng Xiaoping.  Deng was unwilling to 
perpetuate the phenomenon of leader worship like that during the Cultural Revolution 
and the “cult of Mao.”  Deng only appeared in propaganda materials when he felt  it 
was necessary for him to establish his legitimacy.136 Some exceptions were examples 
of art commemorating important events like the founding of the People’s Republic or 
the deaths of influential theoreticians and socialist heroes like Marx and Lenin.  In 
literature, top  leaders rarely appeared at  all.  Leaders who had been influential in the 
“golden years” of the revolution in the 1950s and had subsequently run afoul of Mao’s 
purges got some literary  support in the post-Mao years.137 In general, however, leaders 
did not play a major role in post-1978 propaganda.
 The decline of the propaganda poster and propaganda in general began in the 
early to mid 1980s.  The possible reasons for the decline are many.  In terms of the 
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media’s accessibility, people during this era had an unprecedented range of choices; 
thus one of the party’s greatest assets when it comes to controlling media, the 
complete monopoly over its production, was weakened.  In addition to radio, which 
had been accessible to some degree for decades, television and movies exploded in 
popularity.  By 1982, the Chinese film audience was estimated to be 10 billion people 
(this statistic obviously reflects some individuals who were patronizing theaters 
multiple times), possibly larger than the audience for fiction was.  Moreover, the 
messages behind some of the most popular movies were serious political 
commentaries that were critical of the party and state.138  Given the option of being 
exposed to newly permitted risky unofficial political thought and the quotidian 
political indoctrination that propaganda media had come to represent, audiences 
preferred the former.  The fact that film did not demand literacy of its viewer (though 
did passively demand Mandarin competence) was probably also a factor.  Another 
reason the role of propaganda posters declined in the 1980s was the increased 
preference on the part of artists and audience for realism.  This artistic trend, “new 
realism,” was associated with scar literature because a typical theme for a “new 
realist” painting portrayed the human cost of the Cultural Revolution.139 Attempts at 
introducing realism into official art  were generally  not well-received.  One example is 
a version of the painting With You in Charge, I Am at Ease, originally  painted by Peng 
Bin and Jin Shangyi in 1976.  The 1978 draft painted by  Han Xin and Wei Jingshan 
depicts Chairman Mao not disrespectfully, but realistically, showing him to be the 
frail, 83 year-old man he was in 1976.  Though the Art Creation Office of the 
Municipal Revolutionary Committee approved the painting, it was removed from 
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exhibition before the opening.140 With regard to literature, besides market influences, 
the availability  of semi-official and unofficial publications including Hong Kong and 
Taiwanese publications as a factor that undermined party  control over literary  content 
and production.141 Semi-official and unofficial publications included student literary 
journals, tabloids, and unofficial literary magazines.  Though the government tried 
with some success to suppress these materials by limiting their purchase of paper and 
use of printing presses, these materials remained popular due to the rise of commercial 
publishing.142 
 As the Modernization era transitional economy took its present thriving 
market-economy form, consumerism became an ideology unto itself.  Perry Link 
writes in Evening Chats in Beijing:
…Chinese consumerism rebounded from the forced austerity  of the 
Cultural Revolution period.  But it was not  just the shortages of the past 
that fueled consumerism; it was also uncertainty about  the future.  For 
how long will we have this opportunity  to buy things?  Deng Xiaoping 
is an old man; will state policy  change again when he departs?  The 
unpredictability of party policy in the past had encouraged in people a 
"get what you can while you can get it" approach to the market and, 
indeed, to life generally.143
With consumer ideology came consumer values such as the importance of quality  and 
individualism.  These demands increasingly dictated the course of the media as artists 
began striving to satisfy consumer preferences rather than political preferences.  This 
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phenomenon is evidenced by the appearance of commercial tabloids from unofficial 
publishers, which despite (or perhaps owing to) a 1986 official ban, continued to grow 
in popularity.144 Similarly in the art world, artists operating outside official structures 
increasingly  catered to foreign collectors, even spurning national exhibitions.145 This 
commercialist  attitude, a creative influence largely responsible for the diversity in the 
Chinese art and literary worlds, was ostensibly  a significant factor in eliminating the 
communist party’s mastery of the media and the monopoly on its application.    
 Changing values in post-Mao China is, happily, an area on which enough 
research has been done that one can draw concrete conclusions.  “Value Change 
Among Post-Mao Youth: The Evidence from Survey Data,” by Stanley Rosen is one 
such study.  He first gives a number of prudent warnings about methodological 
problems that could complicate interpretation of the studies, including large numbers 
of non-respondents in politically sensitive surveys, difficulties in choosing appropriate 
samples, and survey design.146  However, he draws interesting conclusions from the 
survey data that support  the above claims regarding distaste for political influence in 
daily life and increasing commercial values.  One survey examining the question 
“What Ideological Qualities Should University Students in the 1980s Possess?” shows 
that students valued personal intellectual prowess over political obedience.  58.6 
percent of respondents indicated that “Dare to think and be good at thinking” was the 
most important, while only 3 percent of respondents thought “Listen to what the party 
says and be a revolutionary successor” was the most important ideological quality. 
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The authors warned that this was a dangerous trend. 147Another survey showed a deep 
distrust for cadres who have a great deal of influence over everyday life (like those 
who decide job allocations).  “When asked their deepest impression of current cadres, 
the largest number (41.9 percent) chose “contemptible, hateful, and detestable,” 
followed by  “other” (41 percent), and then “frightening” (10.2 percent).  Only  2.5 
percent chose “worthy of respect and approachable.”148  To say that this distaste for 
political interference in everyday life is a reaction against the extremes of the Cultural 
Revolution might be premature, since this 1985 survey of college students reflects the 
opinions of students who would have been aged roughly  11-15 in 1976.  However, the 
sentiment of hostility  toward political influences in daily life is clear.  In his 
conclusion, Stanley Rosen writes a wonderfully  incisive statement about consumerism 
in post-Mao Chinese culture, “…the post-Mao ideological vacuum, which offers little 
policy justification beyond the development of the economy, had contributed to the 
use of money as a standard for success.”149  This statement is not only true for many 
Chinese people, but also true for the Chinese government, the legitimacy  of which 
increasingly relied on economic prosperity.
 Stefan Landsberger writes of Chinese media in the 1980s, “…the well-
organized system for propaganda, agitational and political education, modeled on the 
traditional and centuries-old Confucian mechanisms of social control, had to compete 
with the 'informal penetration of national sovereignty by electronic media, through 
mail flows, popular literature and other media likely to escape official scrutiny."150 
91
147 Ibid., p. 201-202
148 Ibid., p. 202
149 Ibid., p. 212
150 Landsberger, Stefan From Revolution to Modernization, p. 11
One explanation for the decline of propaganda is that propaganda like that of the 
1942-1976 era is obsolete in a society that strives for modernization; and the 
propagated behaviors are irrelevant to changing economic realities.  However, if one 
looks at the decline of propaganda through the scope of the roughly contemporaneous 
phenomenon of scar literature, scar art, and available survey data, it  appears that the 
Cultural Revolution and other previous political factors contribute to an overall 
hostility toward invasive politics.  In short, it is clear that  Chinese society became 
hostile to penetrative politics rather than, or at least in addition to, simply getting too 
distracted by modernization to be concerned with it.  
After the Anti-Spiritual Pollution campaign, the next major crackdown on the 
media was the Tian’anmen Incident in 1989.  The intellectual atmosphere in China 
during the late 1980s was of increasing popular unrest.  Student activists in support of 
democratic political reforms reacted to the death of Hu Yaobang, who was a seen as a 
liberal influence in the party. Ostensibly a movement to mourn Hu’s death, the student 
presence in Tian’anmen grew and their demands grew along with it.  On May 20, the 
government declared martial law, but the protests continued.  On June 4th, soldiers and 
tanks of the People's Liberation Army were deployed, and in the resulting violence, 
many student protesters as well as PLA soldiers were injured or killed.  The scope of 
the crackdown proved not only the limitations on post-Mao freedom of expression (i.e. 
discussions of structural changes to the Party were forbidden), but also severely 
damaged China’s international reputation.  After the incident, there were no reforms in 
response to student  demands. Stefan Landsberger writes, “In the second half of that 
decade [the 1980s], politically inspired printed matter almost completely  disappeared, 
only to be reintroduced with a vengeance after the Tian’anmen incident of June 1989. 
Even then, however, propaganda posters had lost most of their previous staying 
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power.”151  It is clear from the response among conservative factions in the Party  that 
they  blamed the liberal cultural trends in the period between the end of the Cultural 
Revolution and Tian’anmen for the 1989 incident.  However, electronic media, value 
changes, cynicism toward intrusive political materials, and the new market economy 
all play a role in propaganda materials’ continuing decline.
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“Even political repression in China today bears a self-righteous air, as though its 
acceptance by the general populace testifies to the state’s mandate to achieve wealth 
and order through whatever means necessary….  As long as the government’s 
legitimacy comes exclusively from maintaining economic growth and social stability, 
its official ideology will remain a meaningless signifier awaiting appropriation by the 
newborn economic and class interests and positions in the differentiated social 
sphere.”152
                                                                  -Xudong Zhang, in Whither China?
 Before the mid 1980s, nearly all printed media was sold through the Xinhua 
shudian (New China Bookstores).153 When market reforms allowed entrepreneurs the 
opportunity to run their own  small bookstores and presses, distribution of the media 
was no longer under central control.  That  is not to say the content of media is not still 
under a measure of central control.  As the Tian’anmen Incident in 1989 made 
abundantly clear, even in the new free market society, the scope of free speech is 
limited—license to publish is still controlled by  the State Council.  Some topics, 
especially those that could challenge the primacy of the Communist Party, but also 
information like the number of drug addicts, people living with HIV/AIDS, people 
executed each year, the seriousness of the unemployment problem, the frequency  and 
seriousness of public protests, are all strictly controlled.  Even information important 
to humanitarian efforts like the number of casualties from natural disasters was 
considered a state secret until only  recently.154  While by the 1990s the CCP no longer 
had firm control over artistic and literary spheres, propaganda never completely 
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disappeared.  Indeed, walking around a major city like Beijing, one constantly 
encounters posters promoting putonghua (Mandarin, official dialect) or promoting 
patriotism, moral virtue, and sanitation.  Some posters discourage littering, spitting, 
and even piracy (Figure 28).  Though dissent-themed materials could never enjoy the 
same distributorship that state-sponsored propaganda materials received in the past, 
works of art and literature that do not coincide with Party preferences have found 
other markets.
 Perhaps the greatest contemporary change affecting Chinese media through the 
1990s and today is the increasing accessibility of the internet.  A full discussion of 
how access to the internet affects Chinese society and the degree to which it 
undermines state control over information is a topic for another paper (if not books). 
To summarize, however, the internet has become the arena for a constant struggle 
between authoritarian party  structures that attempt to control information-- namely  the 
State Council Information Office and the Ministry  of Information Industry, and 
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Figure 28: Artist Unknown, 
Strike Hard at Piracy, 1997/1998
increasingly  tech-savvy Chinese internet citizens who often find ways to get  around 
these controls.  Xiao Qiang, a well-known human rights activist, writes in the China 
Digital Times, a weblog that concentrates on issues in China, “Since 1994, China's 
government has issued at  least 38 laws and regulations aiming to control the 
Internet.”155  The Party controls information posted on the internet  based on a system 
that holds internet providers and hosting services responsible for the potentially 
sensitive content that their customers might post.  Failure to remove sensitive content 
may result in financial penalties, or worse, loss of their business license.  As a result, 
out of concern for their own pocketbook, providers hire censors to monitor and censor 
information based on a list of banned terms, a complete list of which was published in 
the China Digital Times on June 24th, 2005.156  The article also breaks down the 1024 
term list into rough categories: falungong related ~ 20%; Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan ~ 
15%; names of Chinese leaders and their relatives ~ 15%; democracy, corruption, 
politics ~ 15%; social unrest, police ~ 10%; names of dissident writers, political exiles 
~ 10%; pornography related ~ 15% .157   Western businesses, including Microsoft, 
Google, and Yahoo are eager to tap  into the huge Chinese internet market and 
cooperate with and facilitate these repressive regulations.  Control over the internet is 
not limited to a “cat and mouse” game of content posting and removal, however.  Even 
attempting to post forbidden information can get one into serious trouble.  Xiao writes, 
“Since 2000, China's police force has established Internet departments in more than 
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700 cities and provinces.  The Chinese net police monitor Web sites and email for 
‘heretical teachings or feudal superstitions’ and information ‘harmful to the dignity or 
interests of the state.’”158  These measures make it difficult for Chinese “netizens” to 
post content, but from personal experience, I can say  that accessing content is not very 
difficult.  Getting around “The Great Firewall” is often a simple matter.  For example, 
to access the forbidden BBC news website, one only needs to search for content using 
Google, and access the cache of the desired webpage.  One could also use a proxy 
server to access webpages remotely.  These techniques are well known to most foreign 
internet users in China, but it’s hard to say how many of China’s estimated 100 million 
web users use these methods.  It is possible that many  Chinese people do not even 
know that the firewall exists.159
 Another phenomenon in contemporary Chinese media is “retro-Maoism,” or 
Maore that is evidenced even today by the ubiquity of his image (especially for the 
benefit of tourists) and his status as a pop-icon.  In the early 1990s, images of Mao 
could be found everywhere: on t-shirts and talismans, in TV and movies, and on 
household items such as clocks.  This sudden resurgence of Mao’s popularity seems 
directly  opposed to the attitude that is hostile toward political images in everyday life; 
however, in “Redemption and Consumption: Depicting Culture in the 1990s,” Beijing 
University  professor Dai Jinhua describes this new incarnation of the Chairman as the 
“cultural Mao Zedong,” as a manifestation of  “the mutual coexistence of the 
ideological state apparatus and an emerging public space, two opposite entities that 
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cannot but deconstruct each other through several coexisting but conflicting 
sociocultural symptoms….”160
 The commercialization of Mao’s image has an element that was missing in previous 
eras: personal choice.  Today, the Chinese people can choose to buy a Mao pin, 
perhaps for nostalgic reasons, and not have to worry that not wearing one might 
indicate insufficient dedication to the Party.  The popularity  of his commercial image 
is actually against the spirit the Cultural Revolution-era representations, though 
ostensibly  similar in appearance.  Lending Mao’s image the most mundane artifacts 
hawked cheaply on the street to citizens and foreign tourists alike and distorting his 
image in artwork is a powerful humanizing factor.  These tendencies refute the 
sanctity of his image while simultaneously acknowledging its power and nostalgic 
significance.  The use of Mao’s image for commercial purposes is also indicative of 
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uncertainty on the part of the Party about how to represent Mao.  Peter Hitchcock 
writes in an essay entitled “Mao to the Market:” 
…while much of the ridicule heaped on Mao in images is an entirely 
understandable catharsis, particularly for those who were victimized in 
the Cultural Revolution, its playful exuberance is not  out of step with 
current state ideology, which is mightily  confused about how to 
represent Mao as anything other than the banal equivalent of Ronald 
McDonald [….]  In this respect, Mao is the agon of Chinese capitalism, 
the image about which globalization struggles to rationalize the 
inequities of the market to a fifth of the world's population.161 
Despite the commercialization of his image, the Chinese Communist Party  still openly 
uses Mao as a legitimizing element.  President Hu Jintao said in 2003 on the 100th 
anniversary of Mao’s birth, “Mao is a matter of pride for the CCP, the Chinese people 
and the entire Chinese race.  Whatever the time and whatever the circumstances, we 
must always hold up the great banner of Mao Zedong thought.”162
Throughout the 1990s, Chairman Mao and Maoist  icons such as the “Mao suit” 
and the ‘Little Red Book” were increasingly used in artwork as points at which 
Chinese consumers could confront memories of a revolutionary past as well as present 
consumer reality.  Art critic and curator Zhu Qi writes, “One characteristic of post-
political society  was the erosion of the authority of political symbols.  In Zhan Wang’s 
[an artist known for this type of art] works, the Mao suit loses its air of uprightness, 
much as the integrity  of many  of China’s intellectuals had withered.  In some respects, 
Zhan Wang’s Mao suits look like they have been both physically  and spiritually 
disembodied and discarded in long deserted ruins, reflecting the loss of a once 
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powerful symbolic force.”163  The comparison between communists’ past treatment of 
intellectuals and the new symbology  of communist icons in contemporary art is an 
interesting one.  Whether this art is in response to the commercialization of communist 
icons or a deliberate counterattack on the part of artists, it is indicative of a freedom 
and willingness on the part of artists to engage the topic of Communism in art without 
the guidance of the Party.  Another well-recognized artist who created such works is 
Wang Guangyi.  Born in Harbin in 1956 and a graduate of the Zhejiang Academy of 
Fine Arts, his paintings have been successful both domestically and in the foreign 
market.  His work often depicts images strongly reminiscent or taken directly  from 
Cultural Revolution-era propaganda and fuses them with registered trademarks or 
other readily recognized commercial images (Figure 29).  This combination is a 
powerful one when one takes into account the widely recognized ideological authority 
that these images used to have.  Similarly, these works effectively represent 
commercial icons and consumerism as a new source of ideology, a theme that also 
appears in late 1980s and 1990s Chinese literature.  
One literary example is a short story  “I Love American Currency”“ (Wo ai 
meiyuan) by Zhu Wen, which was written in 1996.164  The title “I Love American 
Currency” could be taken as an attempt to exploit  shock value as a common marketing 
tactic but is also an immediate assault on any idealistic notions the reader may have 
about the character of urbanization or modernization in China.  This title is well suited 
to the goals of this work, as it  sacrifices sentimentality and romanticism for a more 
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real expression of the conflict between the old ideologies of state-managed economy 
and Socialism and the ideologies of consumerism, urbanization, and changing social 
values in response to the post-revolutionary market economy.  In the story, a failed 
writer, attempting to express his love for his father, tries to find his father a sexual 
partner.  Throughout the story the main character (who remains nameless, 
significantly) objectifies people, sex, all feelings, and ultimately his love for his father. 
Accepting sex and love as a trope for any other consumer good shows to what degree 
this character’s ideals are based on a commercial consciousness.  The main character 
ultimately  objectifies himself when he defines his worth by a comparison to the cost of 
an expensive prostitute.  He observes that she makes more in half an hour selling her 
body than he does selling a story that may take him months to write.165 To him, price 
is the most honest measure of worth.  What kind of value system does drawing such a 
comparison reveal?  On one hand this sort of conclusion appeals to a biting, satirical 
sense of humor evident in Zhu Wen’s earlier works, among which “我爱美元” is 
included.  On the other hand, even though the juxtaposition of the prostitute and the 
writer leads to a logical/ideological conflict, it also indicates that Zhu Wen perceives a 
fundamental shift  in Chinese culture, where value is assigned based on income, urban 
modernism is preferred over rural “backwardness” of the model socialist image of 
citizen, and post-revolutionary market economy is the progenitor of hopes and ideals. 
The story is an example of a post-revolutionary society straining to find meaning and 
gratification from a consumer ideology.  Before modernization a writer’s struggle was 
with an oppressive political system promoting homogeneity; now as a result of the 
new market economy and rampant consumerism, writers increasingly express 
dissatisfaction with the ennui that consumer culture promotes.  The author of the story 
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questioning his own value is the ultimate commentary on consumer ideology, 
transcending the characters and the paper on which they are constructed.  
One problem or misunderstanding among analysts of Chinese art and literature 
is the belief that works created outside socialist  media controls automatically  equate to 
dissent.  Some artists have commentary about society that is divorced from the 
concerns of politics. Some artists use propaganda imagery from previous eras because 
they  want to invoke the feelings people have toward those periods in time, and others 
use comparable techniques because those are the techniques they are comfortable with 
and used to using.  One young artist said:
[the point] is not to reject social concerns.  Why  can’t I have my own 
opinions about society?  The point is to reject the social convention that 
says we are all supposed to 'fit' our perceptions into works and forms that 
are considered standard-- by the Communist party, by  the opponents of 
the Communist part, or by  somebody else.  Chinese culture demands that 
we fit, and we don’t want to.  But that doesn’t mean we have no opinions 
about the world.  Why should it?  The questions are totally unrelated.166
To reject the idea that an artist is supposed to fit his perceptions into the forms of the 
ruling government is not only a rejection of artists’ roles in Chinese socialist society 
but also Confucian notions of social responsibility.  The result is a model of artistic 
expression much more recognizable to the West, i.e. that  in which the artist or writer is 
primary, and the social effects of his work are secondary, if considered at all.
Comparing Propaganda Art and Literature and Their Effectiveness
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“The media’s power to expand our imaginary universe is as remarkable as its 
potential to direct or control the worlds to which we have access.  We tend, on 
the whole, to absorb its messages, whether eagerly or absent-mindedly.  In daily 
life our powers of vigilance against such unthreatening parts of our environment 
are inevitably limited, and the images that we absorb naturally become part of 
our reality.”167
                            -Julia F. Andrews and Kuiyi Shen 
 Art and literature in socialist China are more similar than they are different in 
content and form, limitations, and theoretical origins.  They were both products of a 
socialist Chinese media system that existed roughly from the mid 1940s to the mid 
1980s.  This means that party  controls relegated them to the role that Mao Zedong 
outlined for them at the Yan’an Talks.  Stylistically, socialist realism dominated both 
media and severely limited innovation.  Both art and literature were subject to 
censorship: both self-censorship  and the censorship of a substantive system of literary 
and artistic control, the purpose of which was unequivocally for social engineering. 
Central authority  had a monopoly on their production and distribution.  The same 
cycle of relaxation and repression governed them; propaganda objectives often 
corresponded, and the scope of the restrictions was the same.  The constant desire on 
the part of part  of artists and writers to work past the style and content restrictions 
placed upon them is in part due to assumptions about the role of a scholar in imperial 
tradition.  Not surprisingly, artists and writers produced the most interesting materials 
in both media during the times of relaxation.  During one such period following the 
Cultural Revolution both media responded by producing scar literature and scar art. 
Both were limited in scope and failed to produce works that  truly conveyed the horror 
of the movement.  
103
167  Link, Perry, et. al. ed. Popular China “Chinese Women and Lifestyle 
Magazines” (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Maryland, 2001) p. 137-161
 The two media differed in one significant way.  One way  to gauge the political 
atmosphere in China at any given time is by examining its media-- not just what is 
produced, but also what is not produced.  The Cultural Revolution, for example, was 
something of a literary  wasteland.  Yet it was one of the most prolific periods for 
propaganda art.  During the late 1970s and early 1980s, when a number of factors 
including political change and market reforms led to a renaissance of Chinese 
literature, propaganda art started its decline.  What factors explain these divergences? 
We have already observed parallel themes in art and literature throughout the various 
social movements, almost exclusively by virtue of their support for political messages 
and movements.  Why should the two diverge on these occasions, namely the Cultural 
Revolution and the Four Modernizations era?  It would appear that despite many 
similarities, art and literature followed parallel courses yet served fundamentally 
different functions.  The difference lies in intended audiences.  Literature has an 
inherent limitation when it comes to its effectiveness: the literacy  of its audience. 
Given this limitation, literature could, in general, only hope to target  urban, educated 
consumers.  Posters, however, were ubiquitous in public and private life, their purpose 
was immediate and direct, and their audience included the poorest peasant to the most 
educated urban elite (though whether or not they affected these classes differently is a 
subject for debate).  Therefore, given this difference, it  is natural that during the 
Cultural Revolution when urban intellectuals were the most oppressed class that the 
media targeting them would decline.  The fact that the repressed social class also 
creates literature is also a factor.  Similarly, during the Four Modernizations era, when 
the Party  regarded its relationship  with the intelligentsia to be of primary importance, 
and writers consequently were subjected to fewer restrictions, naturally literature 
developed more fully.  
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 After an extensive overview of propaganda throughout Chinese socialist 
history, the question still remains: was it effective?  The issue of audience reactions is 
an area that has not received sufficient attention,168 so it is difficult to reach any  solid 
conclusions.  In addition, as audiences became more or less receptive to propaganda 
media throughout the various social movements, it is difficult to gauge how audience 
preferences might change.  For example, an entire generation of Chinese observed 
disaccord between the propaganda messages of the Great  Leap Forward and the reality 
of the situation, thereby  rendering later representations less credible.  Similarly, the 
Anti-Rightist movement was instrumental in creating a kind of paranoia among 
intellectuals, even during comparatively liberal times.  Some concrete factors cast 
doubt on the potential effectiveness of propaganda.  First, illiteracy among the vast 
majority  of Chinese people preordains literature’s latitude of influence to a small 
minority of educated, mostly  urban consumers who constitute only about ten percent 
of the population.169  As a result, only  a few million copies of even the most  popular 
literary  works in the 1960s were created in a population of six to seven hundred 
million.170 Despite its limitations, literature did have a large potential for effectiveness. 
The urban educated minority it could reach is small, but that  minority  is an influential 
one.  This fact is evidenced by the primacy of intellectuals in Maoist policy.  Nearly 
every  major socialist  movement has some element that specifically seeks to regain 
control over the influence of intellectuals; hence, social movements simultaneously 
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shape and are shaped by  the scope of intellectuals’ influence, thereby creating the 
cycle of repression and relaxation that characterizes the history of socialist media.    
 Another way in which one could judge the effectiveness of propaganda media 
stems from the observation that propaganda reflects an attempt to affect change on 
social reality; however, social reality cannot possibly change at the rate social policy 
changed in socialist China.171  This observation leads to the conclusion that social 
policy epitomized in propaganda media could not have reflected social reality  at any 
given time.  This fact is one of the factors responsible for the disconnect between 
idealized socialist  life portrayed in propaganda media and the realities of socialist life. 
Given these conclusions, it is not surprising that after nearly 40 years of 
indoctrination, it took Chinese writers and artists only a few years to break out of the 
molds in which the communist party  had forced them to form; it took Chinese people 
in general only a few years to develop a deeply  cynical attitude toward propaganda 
media.  
  Inherent to the Chinese Communist Party’s belief that propaganda could be 
effective is the assumption that strategic implementation of artistic talent coupled with 
strict party control over distribution and access to media could lead to new social 
consciousness.  Yet in this assumption lies another intrinsic assumption: that the media 
is the active element, conveying the intended message in a uniform and predicable 
way, and the audience is the passive element, absorbing and obeying the message 
without interpretation.  For some of the audience this assumption may be true, but for 
many it is false.  Peasants, who were often touted as both the most loyal Communist 
supporters and used as justification for policy against intellectuals, were not, despite 
appearances, always supportive of the Party.  Perry  Link writes, “But it by no means 
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follows, as the Communist party leadership sometimes claims, that the distance 
between peasants and intellectuals implies peasant support for the state.  …Chinese 
peasantry [live] in chronic resentment of the state, both for the taxes and regulations it 
imposes on their economic activity and for its denigration of their ‘feudal social and 
spiritual life.”172   In Heroes and Villains in Communist China, Joe C. Huang reports 
from a survey  that the most  popular early literature among peasants was that which 
depicted life and events as they experienced them—as realistically  as possible.  He 
writes, “They  contend that only  stories which truthfully  reflect life are good.”173 In the 
progression of socialist history, especially  during the Cultural Revolution, media 
generally  tended to be a less and less accurate reflection of real life.  It is reasonable to 
conclude that as reality and the prescriptive reality  of propaganda diverged, this group 
favored the propaganda less and less.  Viewers are analytical subjects.  They know 
what is expected of them—to read the political slogans, agree with them, and carry 
them out.  But just because they  understand their role in the system does not mean 
they  accept it.  Reader/viewer response could mean maintaining the appearance of 
concession, while simultaneously accepting that the spirit of the message has become 
irrelevant to their daily  lives.  An historian commented on political slogans: “‘People 
seldom read the slogans.  The local officials who put them up  don’t expect others to 
read them.  They just go through the motions, and then their job is done.  That’s what 
everyone expects.’”174 Presenting an appearance of conformity was more important (or 
perhaps more realistic) than following propaganda directives.  
107
172 Link, Perry Evening Chats in Beijing, p. 27-28
173 Huang, Joe C. Heroes and Villains, p. 324-326
174 Link, Perry Evening Chats in Beijing, p. 186
The exposure and ubiquity that propaganda enjoyed did not mean that  it was 
always credible.  For example, one campaign supported by  propaganda posters was 
“third-world solidarity” against imperialism and the association with Sino-African 
relations, was not taken seriously  among the Chinese people.  A reporter said, “‘The 
‘Chinese-African Friendship’ proclaimed by Zhongnanhai [that is, the top leadership] 
doesn’t mean a thing.  No one even takes it seriously  enough to have an opinion on 
it.’”175  Furthermore, people came to understand that media that received official 
sanction was less likely to be interesting or innovative.  One 1986 survey  of film 
audiences found that  people were less likely  to see films that received official 
praise.176  Similarly, a novelist who had been popular before, during, and after the 
Cultural Revolution found that his pre-Cultural Revolution works remained popular in 
the post-Mao years, while the works he wrote during the Cultural Revolution “which 
remained tainted by Cultural Revolution policies…” were not popular in the post-Mao 
years.177   This fact is evidence that audiences were not only  sensitive to the quality of 
art and literature, but that they increasingly  used this quality as a deciding factor in 
forming their preferences.
 Another way to gain insight into propaganda’s potential effectiveness is to look 
at personal accounts.  Xiaomei Chen describes the varying effects propaganda posters 
had in different periods of her life.  Early on, it appears that the effect posters had on 
her was precisely the same as ideologues would hope.  She writes in “Growing Up 
with Posters in the Maoist Era,” “The posters of Lei Feng and various picture books 
depicting his magical transformation from suffering subaltern in the old society to 
108
175 Ibid., p. 225
176 Link, Perry Uses of Literature, p. 257
177 Ibid., p. 175n33
model soldier of socialist China had much to do with planting the seed of national 
pride in me and molding me into an aspiring young citizen of the young republic.”178 
Later, however, she becomes disillusioned with messages in propaganda and continues 
to admire them only as public artworks.179 
Writer Duo Duo also describes the point in the early 1970s at which he could 
no longer respond positively to propaganda posters:
At the age of 20 I got to know Vincent Van Gogh and Picasso.  Since 
then no one can force me to relate to a poster.  When, under the 
permanently watchful eye of our leader, I cycled alone past walls 
covered with posters of big, strong workers, peasants and soldiers, I 
saw myself as [a] figure from a Kafka novel.  That is when I began to 
write and to feel lonely.  That was the beginning of my life in exile.180
Yet despite his reaction against political propaganda, his essay makes it clear that it 
was a large part of his formative consciousness; looking at them makes him feel 
nostalgic.  It is clear that propagation and control over the media did produce an effect, 
but beyond these few testimonies to their deeply  personal influence, it is also clear that 
propaganda simply changed the way people presented themselves, and not necessarily 
their internal attitudes.  Perry Link writes, "Personal behavior is molded partly  by 
social context in any society, but in Mao's China both the degree of required 
conformity and the punishments for aberration increased to a point where people had 
no choice but to work on new ways to present themselves."181 
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Conclusion
This survey of the artistic and literary spheres of socialist China shows the 
ways in which the CCP controlled the arts, adapting them to their propaganda 
purposes, how this control had a tendency to break down and then be reinforced, and 
questions the degree of the effectiveness of propaganda.  Above all, I hope I have 
conveyed the cyclical nature of repression and relaxation exerted over the arts defined 
by the complex relationship  between the Party and intellectuals.  Sometimes relaxation 
was a failed experiment or perhaps even a trap, as during the Hundred Flowers 
campaign; sometimes it was a byproduct of the breakdown of the controlling 
bureaucratic bodies, such as the period between the Great Leap Forward and the 
beginning of crackdown around 1963; other times relaxation was a strategic attempt to 
exploit the talents of intellectuals, so important to the task of modernization. 
Repression was a reaction against a liberalizing trend.  It was motivated by the fear 
party  leaders had for intellectuals’ influence—a fear that is justified by intellectuals’ 
traditional Confucian moral authority.  
The artists and writers of every  era for the most part genuinely wanted to 
contribute to Chinese society, culture, and even the Communist Party.  The restrictions 
placed on their art and, indeed, on their daily  lives, often did not allow them to do so 
outside a very narrow scope that the Communist  government defined.  Artists and 
writers of the early  revolutionary era wholeheartedly  supported the Communist Party 
and made sacrifices to show it.  After the betrayal of the Hundred Flowers Campaign 
by the Anti-Rightists movement, artists and writers learned caution but still for the 
most part felt that the problems with Socialism were within themselves and not 
indicative of a systemic flaw.  Following the Great Leap Forward, artists and writers 
had a brief respite from concerted efforts to support the failing social movement; 
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however, this break was followed by rapid return to conservatism that culminated in 
the Cultural Revolution.  The stringent limitations of style and narrow scope of 
permissible topics during the Cultural Revolution ruthlessly  impoverished the 
development of Chinese art.  Literary output was severely lessened because the 
extremes of the Cultural Revolution affected writers and literary consumers the most. 
Following Mao’s death, the artists gradually shed their stylistic limitations and writers 
again found their voice.  The creation of scar literature and scar art was a hopeful sign 
that spoke to artists’ and writers’ willingness and ability to be expressive outside the 
confines imposed on them from above.  Ultimately, however, political controls 
reasserted themselves and freedom of expression was never achieved.  It would take 
time, economic reform, value changes, and a growing intolerance for intrusive politics 
to develop  arts independent of government controls-- a process that continues today. 
Much more could be said about this process if there were more research on consumer 
preferences and the possible role they had in determining the direction of art  and 
literature.  After all, the arts’ reliance on popular support is already a theoretical truth 
if one were to accept that all the times Mao cited “mass support” to affect change in 
literary and intellectual policy, he genuinely was tapping into mass needs.  
Artistic repression still exists in China today.  The CCP’s ability  to censor 
information is rooted in its presupposed moral authority to do so; the government 
believes that economic growth vindicates its policies and ideologies.  Indeed, given 
this mentality, the Communist government’s legitimacy  is based on maintaining 
economic prosperity and social stability, a fact supported by the types of information 
typically controlled: economic data, certain social welfare information like disease 
deaths and deaths as a result of accidents, and competing ideologies, like falungong. 
Times have changed; but the overall strategy of controlling media to maintain 
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legitimacy  has not.  The question is whether this strategy will work.  Will the new 
market economy paired with modern modes of communication such as the internet 
impinge on the party’s ability  to maintain control over information or will it  merely 
present a new opportunity?  Times, after all, have changed.  
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